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LOGORAMA: The Great Trademark Heist
By Rose Lawrence

I

n 2010 the Academy Award for Best Animated
Short Film went to LOGORAMA, a 16-minute
film by French collective H5. H5 used over 3,000
trademarked logos and mascots without permission
as backgrounds, plots and characters. A Los Angeles
is created from logos serving as buildings, street signs,
vehicles and nature. The inhabitants
include AOL messengers, Pringles
men, and Michelin men. Ronald
McDonald is the villain, who
kills a foul-mouthed Haribo boy
and takes the Big Boy burger boy
hostage. The Esso Girl is the heroine
who escapes the X-Box earthquake
causing California to sink into the
ocean until the new state outlines are a Nike Swoosh.
LOGORAMA is a spectacular movie, but many
question whether it is legal under the Lanham Act and
the 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act. Since their
trademarks were utilized without permission, all of the
depicted trademark owners would seem to have claims
for infringement and - given the crude and violent
nature of the film - claims of dilution by tarnishment
as well. However, recent legislative interpretation
and judicial proceedings appear to indicate that
LOGORAMA is a commercial use eligible for the noncommercial use exception under the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act and protected free speech as parody under
the First Amendment.1
To constitute infringement, a mark must be used
in commerce and likely to confuse consumers as to the
product or service’s origin.2 Claims for infringement
would be available to every mark in LOGORAMA that
was in place of a tree, building, character, geography,
vehicle, etc. For example, in Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt
Disney Co., Caterpillar sought to enjoin the release of
Disney’s “George of the Jungle 2” movie because the
exact Caterpillar trademark was depicted on Caterpillar
bulldozers used throughout the movie.3 The Central
1. This paper is restricted to the United States treatment of Trademarks, state and federal cases are referenced for support.
2. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 22 (2006).
3. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 919-

4

District for Illinois court resisted applying a likelihood
of confusion test to Caterpillar’s claim, but nonetheless
briefly went through the factors.4 The court did
not recognize the presence of competing trademarks
because the trademarks depicted were the authentic
trademark and not confusingly similar trademarks.5
Likewise the court saw no competition
between Caterpillar and “George of
the Jungle 2” videos and DVD sales.6
The court did note Disney’s bad intent
in the unauthorized use of Caterpillar
trademarks, but found it unconvincing as
the Caterpillar trademark was not used to
drive sales or derive consumer awareness
of “George of the Jungle” videos and
DVDs.7
Additionally, the court did not see any evidence
that in using the Caterpillar trademark Disney was
attempting to “poach or free-ride on the fame and
goodwill of Caterpillar’s trademarks.”8 In essence,
Caterpillar’s claims rested heavily on the mere presence
of its trademarks in the movie, and the court responded
by pointing to a long history of products “bearing
well known trademarks” incorporated into movies and
television.9 The court held that the mere presence was
not enough for claims of infringement or dilution in
“George of the Jungle 2.”10 This judicial decision echoes
others for the principle that permission is not needed
for the use of brand names in fiction as long as the
trademark refers specifically to the trademark owner and
there is no confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement.
The same logic seems applicable to
LOGORAMA. Most of the marks used in the film
are merely present in the film and representative of
nothing more than themselves. There is no presence
921 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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of competing marks - the marks used were specifically
chosen because they were recognizable national brands
that reference themselves and no other product.11 Like
in Caterpillar, it cannot be said that the LOGORAMA
film competes with or substitutes the market for the
logos depicted in the film, whose products range from
oil, fast food, toothpaste, financial services, etc. It is
unlikely that the public would think these trademark
owners have branched into the film industry, much
less as a collective. The sheer abundance of trademarks
utilized also weighs against consumer confusion. It is
hard to imagine that a reasonable person would watch
LOGORAMA and believe that 3,000 trademark owners
had functioned together to sponsor the film. Audiences
are accustomed to seeing trademarks in movies, and
do not tend to assume from their presence that the
trademarks depicted represent an endorsement or other
indication of origin. Rather, the marks are accepted as
part of the visual vocabulary of the real world.
Similar to Caterpillar, there is a possible
argument for H5’s bad faith in using the 3,000 marks
without permission. In Caterpillar, the court focused
on whether the mark was used to drive sales of the film,
and found that it was not.12 LOGORAMA is unique
in using nothing but logos, leading critics to question
whether it would have garnered the same attention
without the logos. The use of the logos certainly called
the film to the public’s initial attention; however, it was
the expressive, and not commercial, use of these marks
that was the heart of the film. LOGORAMA was first
available, and remains, free online - its commercial
success can be attributed to winning the 2010 Academy
Award rather than the mere use of the marks.13 Even if a
trademark owner were to argue that the expression of the
marks contributed to LOGORAMA sales, the Northern
District of California court in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media
Mkt. Group, Ltd. commented “expressive use of a mark
is not rendered commercial by the impact of the use on
sales.”14
11. Nominative fair use is not discussed in this paper, as the main
elements of the doctrine concern protection for using one brand to
reference or distinguish another in a descriptive sense. Here there
are no competing brands so nominative fair use is inapplicable,
other then a stretched argument that LOGORAMA does not use
the brands more then is necessary than to describe the world it creates.
12. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 919921 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
13. LOGORAMA can be viewed free of charge at UsefulArts.us,
http://usefularts.us/2010/04/24/watch-logorama-trademarks/.
14. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d
897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

If Caterpillar is controlling, then the additional
claim of dilution by tarnishment against LOGORAMA
is more compelling. Dilution does not require a
likelihood of confusion.15 Dilution by tarnishment
does require that a mark harm the reputation of a
famous mark.16 This happens when the mark is cast in
an unflattering light, typically through its association
with inferior or unseemly products or services.17 The
trademark’s reputation and commercial value could
be harmed “because the public will associate the lack
of quality or the lack of prestige in the defendant’s
goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods, or because
the defendant’s use reduces the trademark’s reputation
and standing in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome
identifier of the owner’s products or services.”18 Finally,
dilution by tarnishment is a claim only available
to famous marks.19 Through the eight factors, the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act effectively restricts
“famous” to nationally recognized brands.20 In
LOGORAMA, the characters that dominate the plot
are Ronald McDonald, the Esso Girl, Big Boy, Haribo,
Michelin, Pringles, and, to a lesser extent, Green Giant
and Mr. Clean. All these marks are representative of
national brands and are therefore arguably “famous.”
In LOGORAMA it is these famous marks that make
up the lead characters, responsible for the cursing, sex,
and extreme violence that drive the plot. However,
the remaining national brands used as buildings,
geography, vehicles, and street signs may be eligible
for consideration under the requirement of harm to
reputation due to their inclusion in the film that features
hyper language, sex, and violence. H5 specifically
chose 3,000 famous national brands for use because
they wanted them to be widely recognized by the
public. However, on this claim LOGORAMA can be
argued to be a protected free speech parody under the
non-commercial exception of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act.
The key factor in finding a non-commercial
use exception under dilution by tarnishment is that an
offending mark must be tied to a product or service and
15. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2006)
16. Id.
17. ToysRUs was successful in bringing a tarnishment claim
against adultsrus.com, a pornographic web-site selling adult entertainment toys and video. Toys “R” Us v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
18. Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2nd Cir.
1994).
19. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C 1125(c)
(2006).
20. Id.
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used in commerce. 21 In Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records
Inc., the “Barbie Girl” case, the Ninth Circuit court
commented on the “noncommercial use” exception
to the Anti-Dilution Act.22 Mattel brought suit for
infringement and dilution by tarnishment against MCA
Records for the single “Barbie Girl” by Aqua wherein
Barbie was enticed to “go party.”23 The court found the
song to be a “commercial use in commerce,” because
the song and the album used the mark and were sold
to the public.24 However, it also found “Barbie Girl”
to be eligible for the non-commercial use exception,
stating a “use in commerce” does not preclude a “noncommercial use” exception.25 Deciding whether speech
is commercial or non-commercial brings the First
Amendment into the fight.
Previously in Hoffman v. Capitol Cities/ABC Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit court delineated between commercial
and noncommercial speech.26 In Hoffman, a magazine
printed unauthorized altered images of Dustin Hoffman
and others. Hoffman sued for the unauthorized use of
the Tootsie image. The court held that “the ‘core notion
of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.’”27 The court found
that if speech is not “purely commercial,” meaning it
does more than a mere commercial transaction, than it is
not infringing for trademark purposes but entitled to full
protection under the First Amendment.28 Specifically,
it held that regardless of the commercial nature, the
magazine ad was protected because of “humor” and
“visual and verbal editorial comment.”29 The fact that
commercial elements were “inextricably entwined with
[these] expressive elements,” lent it protection against
trademark infringement and dilution.30 Mattel also
applied this standard and found “Barbie Girl” by Aqua
to likewise not be purely commercial speech because it
21. “Dilution” refers to the “whittling away of the value of a trademark” when it’s used to identify different products. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24.67, at
24-180; § 24.70 (2001).
22. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
23. Id at 900.
24. Id at 904.
25. Id at 906., citing Jerome Gilson et al., Trademark Protection
and Practice § 5.12[1][c][vi], at 5-240.
26. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.
2001).
27. Id. at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983)).
28. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th
Cir. 2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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expressed Aqua’s view of Barbie.31
LOGORAMA does not use any of the 3,000
marks in connection to a product or service other
then those of the trademarks themselves. Rather,
LOGORAMA utilizes the 3,000 marks to create a world
of contemporary visual vocabulary. The marks are
innovatively used for commentary on themselves as well
as in relationship to each other. Similar to Hoffman, the
commercial value of the LOGORAMA is inextricably
entwined with expressive elements, and therefore the
entirety should be protected under the First Amendment
by its’ “visual and verbal editorial comment.”32 Thus,
under Mattel and Hoffman, it would be difficult to
cast LOGORAMA as “purely commercial” speech.
LOGORAMA therefore should be eligible for the noncommercial speech exception to the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act and protected under the First Amendment.
Specifically, LOGORAMA should be protected as a
parody.
In Mattel, the “Barbie Girl” song was found
to be a parody that ridicules the image and cultural
values Barbie supposedly represents.33 Mattel points
out further legislative history to support that parody
- satire; editorial and other forms of expression were
specifically not part of a commercial transaction in the
purposing of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.34
Mattel referenced a previous ruling in LL Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc. affirming the parody protection.35
LL Bean sought to enjoin the release of the magazine’s
article “L.L. Beam’s Back-To-School-Sex-Catalogue,”
which depicted a mark similar to L.L. Bean’s and
showed nude models using products in sexually explicit
positions.36 The First Circuit court held this to be a
parody, noting that if the anti-dilution statute allowed
trademark owners to enjoin an unauthorized use of its’
31. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
32. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th
Cir. 2001).
33. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
34. The proposed law “will not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of
expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.” Mattel,
Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec. H14317-01, H14318
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead)).
35. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
36. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.
1987).
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trademark from being used in noncommercial contexts
that were negative or offensive then “a corporation could
shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its
name in commentaries critical of its conduct.”37 The
First Circuit cited noncommercial settings to include
editorial or artistic context communicating ideas or
expressing points of view.38 Furthermore, the court
referenced a previous decision in which it held that
neither the strictures of the First Amendment, nor the
history and theory of anti-dilution law permit a finding
of tarnishment based solely on the presence of an
unwholesome or negative context in which a trademark
is used without authorization.39 LOGORAMA depicts
the majority of its unauthorized famous marks in an
unwholesome context, such as Ronald McDonald killing
the Haribo Boy and taking Big Boy hostage, an upthe-skirt view of the Green Giant, and an extroverted
homosexual Mr. Clean zoo guide. L.L. Bean and Mattel
would indicate that though perhaps unwholesome and
negative, these depictions alone are not actionable.
The crux of such protected expression is a parody
that requires the target of the parody to be the mark
itself and not the use of the mark to make a broader
statement. In Rogers v. Koons, a copyright case, artist
Jeff Koons made a sculpture from a photograph by Art
Rogers.40 The Second Circuit found Koons’ parody fair
use defense unconvincing.41 The court held that the
copyrighted work is required to be at least in part the
target of the defendant’s satire to be legally considered a
“parody.”42 However, the court also said that the “satire
need not be only of the copied work and may . . . also
be a parody of modern society” but it was critical the
original work still be a target as well.43 The purpose
of this requirement was the court’s insistence that “the
audience be aware that underlying the parody there
is an original and separate expression, attributable to
a different artist.”44 The court did not find parody or
37. Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or
expressing points of view. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High
Frontier, 662 F. Supp. 931 (D.C. 1985)).
38. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31-34
(1st Cir. 1987).
39. Id.
40. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d at 185 (2d. Cir. 1981); 3 Nimmer, §
13.05[C] n. 60.9).
44. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).

sufficient satire, as the commentary of the banality of
society Koons was after could have been achieved by
other means and was not tied to the Rogers work for
expression.45
The copyright understanding of parody and
satire is analogous in trademark law, as the court in
Mattel relied on this in deciding that the “Barbie Girl”
expression was protected as a parody.46 While targeting
Barbie specifically, the song had a broader message as
well due to Barbie’s status as a cultural icon in society.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit court in Dr. Seuss Ents.,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., did not find parody
where the defendants used the writing style of Dr. Seuss
and the trademark striped stovepipe hat on the front
and back cover in a retelling of the O.J. Simpson trial.47
Neither Dr. Seuss nor the trademarked Cat in the Hat
were the targets of the parody, rather they were used
to comment on the O.J. Simpson trial.48 The court
held that in situations where the artistic work targets
an original work and does not use it merely to garner
attention, the First Amendment has greater weight in
the balancing test of trademark interests and protected
speech.49
LOGORAMA targets the marks themselves
in creating an elaborate parody for artistic expression.
Ronald McDonald, a wholesome mark representing
McDonald’s, is primarily used to engage children
in the consumption of McDonald’s fast food. In
LOGORAMA, Ronald kills a child and threatens
another before escaping on a Grease 2 motorcycle and
crashing into a giant Weightwatchers truck. Similar to
Mattel where Aqua targeted the cultural values associated
with the Barbie Icon, LOGORAMA here targeted the
cultural values associated with McDonald’s icon, Ronald
McDonald. Both placed trademarked icons in hyper
realities of sex or violence to parody their traditional
values. During the X-Box earthquake, the corporate
symbols initially shown as pillars in the society are seen
crashing to the earth- including the Enron, K-Mart,
and Freddie Mac corporations that have been involved
in recent and very public scandals. Likewise, logos
seen drowning in oil include Phillips 66, Chrysler,
and the “W” from the George W. Bush reelection
45. Id.
46. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
47. Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394
(9th Cir. 1997).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1408.
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campaign of 2004 - all logos connected strongly to oil
production. While not all of the marks achieve the
same level of parody, as already discussed in Caterpillar,
mere presence is not actionable. Additionally, those
logos that don’t have as strong of a claim to parody
are not used “merely to garner attention” which was
the concern in Dr. Seuss. The use of every mark lends
to the greater message of the film. One such instance
occurs near the end of the film as an IBM building is
seen collapsing. As it falls to the ground its slogan loses
an “s” to read “Solutions for a mall planet.” The larger
parody is of a hyper consumption of the developed
world and the overwhelming presence of brands in the
public consciousness.50 However, it is important to note
that this broader parody is a natural result of parodying
multiple brands at once and is not an independent
critique that could have been made without the use of
marks. Thus, LOGORAMA would seem to fit nicely
into the Koons’ court’s consideration of copyright, in that
a parody can be a parody of modern society as long as
the original work is still targeted.51
This difference is important to note because the
line between parody and satire is a hotly debated topic
since Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.52 There, the
Supreme Court differentiated between a parody that
targets and mimics the original work to make its point
and a satire that uses the work to criticize something
else, therefore requiring justification for the very act of
borrowing.53 The Court specifically avoided creating a
bright line rule regarding parody and satire in Campbell,
pointing out the often hybrid nature of parody
and satire.54 Campbell merely states that the more
attenuated the parody, the stronger the scrutiny and that
“looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as
may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than
would otherwise be required.”55 Recent developments
support the specific protection of unauthorized use
trademarks in satire based on their intrinsic expressive
value in society.
50. Esteban Del Rio, FlowTV, Logorama’s Chaotic Critique of Corporate Rule, Mar. 26 2010 available at http://flowtv.org/?p=4857. It
is important to note this article uses parody and satire interchangeably, and does not use them in a legal sense.
51. “Though the satire need not be only of the copied work and
may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must
be, at least in part, an object of the parody.” Rogers v. Koons, 960
F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994).
53. Id. at 582.
54. Id.
55. Id.

8

Judge Kozinski, who wrote the majority opinion
in Mattel, noted in his 1993 speech “Trademarks
Unplugged” that “when trademark owners put their
mark to the public in well-orchestrated campaigns
intended to burn them into our collective consciousness,
the owners must then relinquish control over the
trademark as a consequence of seeking such exposure
because the mark has taken on symbolic meaning as part
of society at large.”56 After a trademark has become part
of the public discourse, the paramount concern in any
balancing test must be the public’s right to make use
of the mark.57 Further judicial proceedings have noted
trademarks’ unique expressive capacity as well.
In Yankee Publishing, Inc., v. News American
Publishing, Inc., the Southern District of New York court
noted that many trademarks assume expressive value due
to their prominence in culture.58 “When unauthorized
use of another’s mark is part of a communicative message
and not a source identifier, the First Amendment is
implicated in opposition to the trademark right.”59 In
Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit court held that
“in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest
in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression.”60 Famous marks have
particularly strong powers of expression, especially if
they are cultural icons.61 Their fame has integrated the
marks into daily life as well as public vocabulary; the use
of the trademark is the most efficient way to reference
it.62 The emerging arguments concerning trademarks’
unique expressive power in the public consciousness
would seem to strengthen the argument for satire. In
a world populated by brands, it becomes necessary to
include marks, whether the subject of parody or satire,
for the expression to be successfully understood. The
Mattel court seems to agree, stating, “Trademarks often
fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary
flavor to our expressions.”63 Thus, if LOGORAMA were
56. Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 976 (1993).
57. Id.
58. Yankee Publ’g, Inc., v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 809 F.Supp. 267,
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
59. Id.
60. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. Steven Cordero, Cocaine-Cola, The Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 599 (1998).
62. Robert Denicola, Trademarks As Speech, 1982 Wis.L.Rev. 158
(1982).
63. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.
2002).
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to be considered satire rather than parody, it is possible
it would still be protected. It is hard to talk about
brands and consumption without using the brands that
are nationally known. As a result of the film utilizing
so many marks, LOGORAMA naturally assumes a
secondary meaning beyond the marks.
Further support for a finding of non-commercial
exception of parody in LOGORAMA is illustrated in
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC,
where Tommy Hilfiger sought to enjoin an animal
perfume entitled Timmy Holedigger. The court for
the Southern District of New York reasoned that the
strength of the mark subject to parody might make it
easier for an audience to recognize the use as a parody.64
The marks used in LOGORAMA are nationally
recognized brands whose reputation is well established,
their depiction in the film is in total opposition to
their established reputation. This extreme contrast
should assist in a finding of parody. The concern in
the copyright Koons case was that the audience must be
aware that there is an original and separate expression
attributable to a different artist.65 In the hands of
H5, the marks in LOGORAMA become something
other and extremely different than what they were and
it is understood these new marks are their creation,
independent of the originals. Additionally, in deciding
trademark dilution in Caterpillar, the court emphasized
the “cartoon” nature of the film through its borrowing of
motifs from animated films such as “belated recognition
close-ups, collisions so bone-jarring that George’s
outline is left embedded into a tree and other such well
established cartoon clichés that clearly establish the
fantastic nature of the movie.”66 This fantastic nature
lends to the idea that the public would not see the
Caterpillar trademark used in the movie as an association
that would harm the reputation of the trademark
owner.67 LOGORAMA is an animated film, involving
similar motifs of the cartoon genre that, like Caterpillar,
establish the fantastic nature of the film. Despite the
extreme nature of the actions of many characters,
the cartoon world should be sufficient for a court to
find that the public would not see the associations in
LOGORAMA to harm the marks depicted.
Judicial precedent seems to indicate that those
64. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC., 221 F.
Supp 2d 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
65. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
66. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 923
(C.D. Ill. 2003).
67. Id.

trademark owners who would bring claims of trademark
infringement and dilution by tarnishment against
LOGORAMA are unlikely to be successful. Factors that
would normally be considered in a straight trademark
infringement likelihood of confusion analysis are
lacking. Most notably, there is an absence of competing
goods, as the marks represent themselves in the film
and the film cannot be considered in competition with
them based on the reasoning in Caterpillar.68 Also based
on the sheer abundance of trademarks used, there is no
likelihood of consumer confusion as to endorsement,
sponsorship, or other indication of ownership. In
terms of dilution, artistic expression has been found
to be outside the scope of the anti-dilution statute’s
protection of unauthorized use of trademarks in the
marketing of “incompatible products or services.”69
LOGORAMA is thus a daring example of the noncommercial use exception to the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act and protected speech as parody under
the First Amendment. It is unlikely, however, that the
courts will have a chance to decide on this issue. Since
winning the 2010 Academy Awards, LOGORAMA has
garnered international attention and goodwill. It would
be poor policy on behalf of the trademark owners to file
suit. In fact, in the aftermath of the Oscars, it appears
some trademark owners seem happy to have been
recognized as “famous” enough to be included and have
expressed no interest in pursuing trademark violation
claims.70 As a tongue-in-cheek response to the whole
trademark question, H5 producer Nicolas Schmerkin
in his acceptance speech thanked the 3,000 non-official
sponsors that appear in the film and assured them that
no logos were harmed in the making of LOGORAMA.71

68. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913
(C.D. Ill. 2003).
69. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1987).
70. Cash Converter, a depicted trademark, thanked H5 for including it in the film. Esteban Del Rio, Logorama’s Chaotic Critique
of Corporate Rule, FlowTV, Mar. 26 2010 available at http://flowtv.
org/?p=4857.
71. Id.
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King Kirby and the Amazin’ Terminatin’ Copyrights: Who Will Prevail?!?
By Jay Goldberg
“There is a war coming. Are you sure you’re on the right
side?”1
-Wolverine

I.

Introduction

power to exploit a copyright enables its possessor to reap
untold profits, the battle between the parties rages fierce.
While artists may not have the ability to summon superstrength or x-ray vision to their aide in this conflict,
they may in certain circumstances exercise their right
of copyright termination under the Copyright Act of
1976 (“the Act”) to regain control of their creations.3
This, however, oftentimes proves more
difficult that it might initially seem, as
publishers are not without their own
arsenal of statutory powers.

Studies in dualism
permeate the history of comic
book storytelling: the righteous
Superman does battle with the
This article elucidates this
evil mastermind Lex Luthor; the
aspect
of
the conflict between artist
benevolent Batman combats the
and publisher, specifically focusing on
destructive and nihilistic Joker; the
the ongoing legal struggle between the
compassionate Professor Charles
heirs of comic book artist Jack Kirby
Xavier and apocalyptic Magneto
and Marvel Entertainment.4 First,
engage in a struggle by which the
this article gives a brief introduction
very future of humanity hangs
to the Kirby litigation, focusing on
in the balance! While these epic
the origins of the conflict and the
confrontations play out on the
relevant legal issues. Next, this essay
pages of comic books a similar, yet
discusses the pertinent provisions of
less simplistic, battle occurs in real
copyright and trademark law, focusing
life: the artist versus the publisher
specifically on copyright termination,
in the battle for copyrights. While
the derivative works exception, and
the real-life conflict may not
the Lanham Act, as well as utilizing
place the fate of humanity at risk,
case law to examine the application of
it does implicate an important
A Creative Commons-licensed photo
the legal concepts. Finally, this essay
and pervasive aspect of our society:
by Flickr user Devlin Thompson
applies
the relevant doctrines to the Kirby
money. Simply put, the storylines
litigation, concluding that while copyright law may vest
and characters developed by the comic book industry
the Kirby heirs with a right to partially reclaim their
are big business. From simple, paperback origins comic
father’s creations, the derivative works exception and
books have spawned television shows, merchandise,
2
the Lanham Act significantly weaken the value of that
videogames, and most lucratively, movies. As the
1. X-Men (Twentieth Century Fox 2000).
2. See generally Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the “Summer of the
Spinoff” Came to Be: The Branding of Characters in American Mass
Media, 23 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 301 (2003) (discussing the conglomeration of the entertainment business, whereby proven entertainment commodities and properties are reused as often as possible
in order to maximize profits, recognizing the extremely valuable
nature of brand name characters). See also The Internet Movie
Database, All-Time Box Office: World-wide, http://www.imdb.
com/boxoffice/alltimegross?region=world-wide (last visited Apr. 4,
2010) (noting that some of the top worldwide grossing movies of
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all time were based on comic books, for example, The Dark Knight
($1,001,921,825), Spider-Man 3 ($885,430,303), and Spider-Man
($806,700,000)).
3. The United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2005)
(granting an artist, or their specifically-designated heir, the right
to terminate a copyright “at any time during a period of five years
beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is
later” if the copyright was executed before January 1, 1978).
4. Complaint at 1, Kirby v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., Case No.
10-00289-CJC-AN (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 9, 2010).
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right. This article concludes by calling on Congress to
revisit the relevant copyright and trademark provisions
and comport them with one another in order to prevent
the further devaluation of a reclaimed copyright by
competing trademark interests.
II.
The Comic Book Industry and Kirby v. Marvel
Entertainment, Inc.
Like any fledgling upstart, the American
comic book industry comes from humble and rocky
beginnings. The early industry was plagued by
disorganization and many times publishers operated
under a “gentleman’s agreement” with their artists,
whereby the artists and the publisher would achieve
a general understanding that the artist would be
compensated for his work, foregoing any formal
contract.5 Many artists responsible for the “Golden
Era” of the comic book industry sold their creations to
publishers on this basis and consequently regretted the
manner in which they conducted their business.6 Jack
Kirby’s heirs allege that he was one of these artists.
Mr. Kirby, widely known as “King Kirby”
amongst his colleagues, is directly responsible for some
of the most famous and lucrative comic book characters
of all time. From 1958 to 1963, Mr. Kirby either
authored or co-authored works containing the characters
The Fantastic Four, X-Men, Iron Man, Spider-Man,
The Incredible Hulk, Thor, The Avengers, Nick Fury,
and Ant-Man (“Kirby Works”).7 At the time of their
creation, Mr. Kirby’s heirs claim that Mr. Kirby was
working on a freelance basis and never committed to any
5. See Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite Consequence: How
the Derivative Works Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut the
Remunerative Value of Termination of Transfers, 16 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 241, 267 (2005) (stating that during the
Golden Age of comic books, work made for hire agreements were
not the norm); Brooks Barnes and Michael Cieply, A Supersized
Custody Battle Over Marvel Superheroes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/business/21marvel.html?8dpc
(quoting Kirby attorney Marc Toberoff as contending that “an
industrywide decency code put so much pressure on Marvel that
few at the company were worrying about contractual niceties with
artists.”).
6. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the heirs of Jerome Seigel, one of
the co-creators of Superman, were entitled to a share of the U.S.
copyright of that character, despite previous agreements between
the parties); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir.
2002) (recognizing Joseph Simon’s right of termination in Captain
America, despite a prior settlement of an authorship dispute).
7. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 19. See generally The
Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com (last visited April
4, 2010) (noting generally that a significant number of Mr. Kirby’s
creation have become lucrative movie properties).

written agreement to create works directly for Marvel’s
predecessors.8
In 1972, Mr. Kirby entered into an agreement
with Marvel’s predecessor whereby he assigned his
interests in the Kirby Works and the original copyrights
to the company and received further compensation.9
On September 19, 2009, the Kirby heirs, pursuant
to 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), served Marvel with notices of
termination of the copyrights of all the Kirby Works to
take effect at the expiration of the statutory period.10
These terminations serve as the basis of the lawsuit at
hand and, if effective, will dictate the extent to which
Mr. Kirby’s heirs may recover under his legacy.
In the section of the complaint pertinent to
this essay, the Kirby heirs put forth two claims for
relief. First, the heirs seek a declaratory judgment that
the notices of termination are effective pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 304(c).11 Second, noting that a declaratory
judgment on the first claim would result in a jointownership of the Kirby Works copyrights, the heirs ask
the court to define “profits” for the purpose of the parties
accounting to one another on future monetary gains.12
As is shown in the sections that follow, the success or
failure of these claims turns primarily on the court’s
application of a number of legal doctrines, including
aspects of both copyright and trademark law.
III.

The Underlying Legal Concepts
A.

Copyright Termination, Works for Hire,
and the Derivative Works Exception
under the Copyright Act of 1976

Copyrights are meant to protect “original works
of authorship in any tangible medium of expression”
and include, non-exhaustively, works of literary, graphic,
musical, or dramatic merit.13 The Copyright Act of
1976 empowers an author, and his or her heirs, with
8. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 22 (asserting further
that Mr. Kirby “worked solely on a freelance basis out of his own
home, with his own instruments and materials and thereby bore the
financial risk of creating his copyrighted materials.”).
9. Id. at ¶ 24.
10. Id. at ¶ 25. See also 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (applying the statutory
time period, note that the Kirby Works would be subject to termination from 2014-2019, 56 years from the original copyrights).
11. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶¶ 30-33.
12. Id. at ¶¶ 34-37.
13. § 102(a). See also Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’n 111 F.2d
432 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that the character of Superman was
protected under copyright law); Emerson, supra note 13, at 214
(mentioning that “graphic representations of characters are inherently expressive and thus considered copyrightable works.”).
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the exclusive right to (a) reproduce their work, (b)
produce derivative works based off the original work,
and (c) display or otherwise perform their work.14 Once
an author obtains a copyright, he may assign those
rights to a third party.15 Nevertheless, the 1976 Act
permits an author, or his statutory heirs, to terminate
the transferred copyright after 56 years (if the copyright
was created before January 1, 1978).16 A termination
allows an author to recapture the copyright and either
exploit the profits garnered from that copyright,
renegotiate the terms of the copyright assignment, or
assign the copyright to another party.17 Importantly,
as the Supreme Court recognized in Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder,18 unlike other rights an author cannot contract
away or assign the right of termination.19 Despite this, it
can still be difficult for an author or his heirs to exercise
the termination right, as many statutory details must be
complied with.20
There are two major exceptions to the right of
termination found in § 304(c) of the 1976 Act, both
of which can seriously reduce the value of a terminated
copyright. First, the Act expressly prohibits an author
of a “work made for hire” from exercising a termination
right on their creation.21 Instead, a work for hire
vests the rights of copyright in the employer. A work
made for hire is defined as “a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment”
or “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work.”22 If an author
creates a work and then later assigns the copyright to a
publisher, however, the publisher may not retroactively
14. § 106. See also Lauren Beth Emerson, Termination of Transfer
of Copyright: Able to Leap Trademarks in a Single Bound?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 207, 213 (2006).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2005).
16. § 304(c).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2005). See also Emerson, supra note 13,
at 207.
18. 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985) (noting that the termination
right exists primarily to protect an author from “the consequences
of ill-advised and unprofitable grants that had been made before
the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his
work product.”).
19. § 304(c)(3), (5).
20. See Emerson, supra note 13, at 221 (recognizing that for a
termination right to be properly executed, it must be done within
a five-year window in which termination is permitted and the terminating party must give between two and ten years notice before
the termination becomes effective, pointing out that when there are
multiple or renegotiated agreements between the relevant parties
this time period can be difficult to identify).
21. § 304(c).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
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deem the work a work made for hire.23
In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon,24 the court
permitted the exercise of an author’s termination right
despite a prior agreement between the parties that the
works in question were works done for hire. Joseph
Simon, the creator of the popular comic book character
Captain America, sought to terminate a copyright
transfer he granted to Timely Publications, a successor
to Marvel Comics.25 In a settlement agreement from
a previous litigation, Simon acknowledged that he
contributed to the Captain America character as an
employee for hire and not on a freelance basis.26 Despite
this previous agreement, the court permitted Simon to
present evidence that he did not, in fact, create Captain
America as a work for hire and that the settlement
agreement was an arrangement between the parties after
the character’s creation.27 Noting that under § 304(c)(5)
of the 1976 Act an author cannot contract away his right
to termination, the court permitted Mr. Simon to effect
terminations, holding that the settlement agreement,
which deemed the work a work for hire after its creation,
was ineffective.28
The second important exception to the right of
termination, pertinent especially in the context of comic
books, eliminates the right for derivative works created
by the copyright holder prior to the exercise of the
termination.29 A derivative work is defined as “a work
based upon one or more preexisting works.”30 Generally
speaking, a derivative work must be “an original work of
authorship,”31 although a derivative author is not under a
requirement to greatly change the original work in order
to receive independent copyright protection.32 While
23. See Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding that even though the creators of a comic strip
revised and expanded the original material at the request of the
publisher, this was not tantamount to a finding that the strip was a
work for hire).
24. 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 283.
27. Id. at 292.
28. Id.
29. § 304(c)(6)(A). See also Chandra, supra note 5, at 278 (utilizing the example of the Superman movie, a derivative work based off
of the comic book, which held its own copyright distinct from the
comic book copyright).
30. § 101.
31. § 101. But see Chandra, supra note 5, at 279 (noting that
divining what elements are to be considered part of the original and
which are unique to the derivative has proven to be a difficult task).
32. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 5455 (2d Cir. 1936) (recognizing that there is no “novelty, creative or
aesthetic requirement for copyright in a derivative work.”). See also,
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the courts have, as of yet, not indentified the full extent
of what constitutes a derivative work, it could potentially
be construed broadly to encompass written story
elements and character traits, as well as the illustrative
representation of any graphical characters.33
In Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., the court
limited the extent of an asserted termination right
under the derivative works doctrine.34 The heirs of
Jerome Siegel, one of the creators of Superman, sought
a declaration that they had successful terminated Mr.
Siegel’s half of the original copyright.35 In partially
granting the plaintiffs’ claim, the court was forced to
deal with various aspects of the copyright, including
international revenues and derivative works.36 While
addressing the issue of international revenues and
copyrights, the court cited the 1976 Act and limited
the plaintiff’s termination recovery to only those profits
realized by the domestic exploitation of the Superman
Action Comics, Vol. 1 copyright.37 The court did not
address what to do, accounting-wise, with any alteration
in pre-termination derivative work. However, it
did hold that profits garnered by the publisher from
unaltered pre-termination derivative works were not
subject to accounting with the plaintiffs.38
It is clear that the doctrines of work for hire and
derivative works limit the value of a copyright recaptured
by an author through exercise of a termination right.
Given that the Simon court held that a work was not a
work for hire even though the publisher deemed it so
after the fact, the modern comic book industry now
makes it standard practice for publishers to require
their artists to enter work for hire agreements up front,
therefore limiting an author’s ability to profit from his
own work..39 The derivative works exception presents
Chandra, supra note 5, at 280.
33. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 277-78.
34. 542 F.Supp.2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
35. Id. (granting the plaintiffs a copyright termination only
with respect to character and story elements as introduced in Action Comics Vol. 1). See also Michael Cieply, Ruling Gives Heirs a
Share of Superman Copyright, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/business/media/29comics.html?_
r=3&ref=business&oref=slogin (noting that the court in Siegel upheld the heirs’ copyright in the material published in Action Comics
Vol. 1 only and did not determine the extent to which later versions
of the character were derived from the original iteration).
36. Id. at 1139-43.
37. Id. at 1140 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(E)).
38. Id. at 1142-43.
39. See, e.g., DC Comics, Submissions/Talent Search, http://dccomics.com/about/submissions.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (noting that DC will not accept unsolicited artwork or writing).

additional difficulty when applied to the comic book
industry, as by their very nature, comic book characters
continually evolve and change with every new issue.
Therefore, it is not a stretch to imagine a court accepting
the argument that a character as it exists today is far
different from the character as originally copyrighted by
the author, thus seriously diminishing the value of the
recaptured copyright.40
B.
Overlap

Trademark Protection and Copyright

In addition to copyright law, trademark
law provides another method by which publishers
may diminish the value of a recaptured copyright.
Trademarks, by definition, are any identifiable articles
that symbolize, and are readily associated with, a specific
brand or producer of goods.41 Under the Lanham Act,
individuals and companies are prevented from using
the distinctive marks of other entities in commercial
activity without permission.42 Unlike copyright law,
which protects an image itself, trademark law is meant to
protect the consumer and the goodwill of the company
who owns the mark.43 Therefore, rather than provide
total coverage against the usage of the mark, only certain
usages are prohibited.44 Also different from a copyright,
a trademark is infinite in its duration and never expires
so long as the entity that owns the mark continues to
exploit that mark in the marketplace.45 An owner may
additionally lose a trademark through genericide, or the
inclusion of the mark into the cultural lexicon.46
It is widely accepted that comic book characters
are protected by trademark in some situations. In
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc.,
the court held that Superman and Wonder Woman
40. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 283 (mentioning that in 1986
DC Comics “killed off” all of its characters only to recreate them
again in the next issue, noting that because of this DC could claim
that it authored all of the characters it now publishes).
41. See Emerson, supra note 13, at 223 (offering that trademarks
can be “words, symbols, logos, sounds, scents, or even colors.”).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
43. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 271 (pointing out that a trademark does not protect the character of Mickey Mouse, but instead
the good will of Disney).
44. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (holding that the use of a brand name in the description of a product is
not trademark infringement).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
46. See, e.g., King-Seeley v. Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (refusing to find a trademark infringement
in the defendant’s usages of the word “thermos” as the word had
become the generic term for describing the good itself rather than
the source of the item).
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were protected trademarks of DC Comics.47 The
defendant ran a singing telegram service, which featured
characters that bore strong resemblance to Superman
and Wonder Woman and were unlicensed by DC. In
their discussion, the court noted that the characters
had long been associated with and utilized by DC in
the marketing of their products. Additionally, the
court recognized that DC carefully chooses when, and
to whom, to license usage of the marks.48 The court
noted that the trademark was not limited simply to the
physical appearance of the characters, but also included
the name, phrases, logos, and design marks associated
with them.49
While trademark law is limited in its application,
it can significantly weaken the value of recaptured
copyright. Although no court has directly addressed
the issue of when copyright and trademark law
overlap in this realm, it appears likely that trademark
protection would interfere somewhat with an author’s
recaptured copyright.50 As the court in Unlimited
Monkey Business recognized, comic book characters and
their distinguishing features have long since become
associated with their publishers and when used in
commerce indicate an implicit approval of the product
by the company that owns the mark.51 In the event
that an author, upon successful termination, decides not
to license a copyrighted character back to the original
publisher he would not be able to start releasing comic
books or other materials of his own, as the publisher
would retain the trademarks associated with the
character.52 In cases such as Kirby, as shown below, this
may present significant difficulty for an artist.
IV.

Application to Kirby

47. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
48. Id. at 113.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc. 481 F. Supp.
1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the trademark protection of
an image of a character may persist even though the copyrightable
character had previously entered the public domain, so long as the
mark possesses an independent value). But see In re DC Comics,
Inc. 689 F.2d 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Neis, J., concurring)
(“[I]f trademark rights are recognized in a picture of a product, the
design itself may be perpetually protected, contrary to the limited
term afforded to some designs under the copyright or design patent
statutes.”).
51. See 542 F.Supp.2d at 1098.
52. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 275 (pointing out that even
though copyright law dictates that upon termination the image
should return to the original author, any subsequent publication or
licensing of that image would be in violation of trademark law, as
most comic book characters have become synonymous with their
long time publishers).
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Before reaching the issues present in the relevant
aspects of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the court must
first decide whether the Kirby heirs possess a right of
termination in the first place. This turns, in essence,
on two issues: did Jack Kirby originally produce the
characters as a freelance artist or as works for hire, and if
he did produce them as a freelance artist does his estate
still possess his right to termination? As the 1976 Act
states, the right of termination does not apply to works
for hire.53 In such a case, the copyrights belong to the
publisher, who is deemed the author of the works.54 If,
on the other hand, Mr. Kirby produced the works with
his own materials and on his on initiative, then his heirs
undoubtedly possess the right to reclaim the original
copyright.55 As discovery has yet to be conducted in the
case, there is no way to know for sure whether the Kirbys
obeyed all the statutory demands of § 304(c). Therefore,
in order to focus on deeper legal implications, this article
continues on the assumption that all facts alleged in the
complaint are accurate.
In the complaint, the Kirby estate claims that
Mr. Kirby created the works at his own expense and not
as works for hire.56 While the reply of the defendant
is not currently available, it is likely that Marvel will
contend that Mr. Kirby produced the works in the stead
of his employment with Marvel. Barring some clearcut evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that the court
will side with the defendant on this issue. Given the
widely recognized state of the industry at the time of
the creation of the Kirby Works, it is likely that Marvel’s
predecessors purchased the works from Kirby on a
consignment basis.57
After finding that the works were produced
as freelance works subject to termination, the court
will then have to move on to the effect of the 1972
assignment of the copyrights from Mr. Kirby to the
publisher.58 In this agreement, Mr. Kirby assigned
his interest in the copyrights to the publisher for
compensation in addition to his original payments
53. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
54. U.S. Copyright Office, Works Made For Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).
55. § 304(c)(6)(C).
56. Complaint at ¶ 23, Kirby v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., Case No.
10-00289-CJC-AN (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 9, 2010).
57. See supra note 5. Which cite in note 5 is this referring to? Provide author name plus pincite. Supra should not be used for cases,
per R.4.2. This refers to note 5 as a whole, not any particular cite
therein. Maybe it can refer to the page of text, not the cite?
58. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 24.
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from Marvel. The court should not have a problem
in holding that this assignment has no effect on the
plaintiff’s ability to exercise the termination right of
the original copyright, as under § 304(c)(5) of the
1976 Act, regardless of any prior agreement to the
contrary an author may effect termination of an original
copyright.59 Assuming that the Kirbys have complied
will all statutory demands contained within § 304, as
they allege, the court must then deal with the effect of
the terminations.
The effect of the Kirby terminations will be
significantly tempered by the derivative works provision
of the 1976 Act and by the relevant aspects of trademark
law. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs essentially ask
the court to include any profits made by the defendant
from exploitation of any new derivative work, either
domestically or overseas, if the overseas profits result
from the “predicate exercise in the United States of any
right under the copyright[s].”60 The plaintiffs, as they
must, concede that they do not possess a right to monies
gained from the exploitation of derivative works created
before the exercise of the termination.61 Therefore,
the value of the termination will turn in part on how
liberally the court decides to apply the derivative works
exception.62
As recognized earlier, comic book characters
inherently evolve from issue to issue. As an example,
it stands to reason that the Wolverine of The Incredible
Hulk #181 is a far different animal than the Wolverine
of X-Men Origins: Wolverine.63 With each incarnation,
Marvel could potentially argue that the Wolverine
of Mr. Kirby’s creation no longer exists. The current
manifestation of the character, the argument goes, is
a derivate work that the publisher itself created and
may continue to exploit on its own.64 Although not
controlling, when considered in connection with the
Siegel case, it seems likely that the court would limit the
recovered copyright to those elements apparent in the
59. See also Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d
1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d
280 (2d Cir. 2002).
60. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 66.
61. § 304(c)(6)(A).
62. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 278.
63. The Incredible Hulk #181 marks the first appearance of the
character of Wolverine as a mutant agent of the Canadian government. The most recent incarnation of the character in the film
X-Men Origins: Wolverine presents Wolverine as a Canadian-born
mutant, who leaves Canada and comes to the United States, joining
the American military.
64. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 282-83.

initial personification of the characters.65 While it is
unlikely that the court would count the entire catalogue
of characters as new and unique derivative creations,
the extent of the reclaimed copyright will likely be
significantly narrowed as a result of the court’s findings.
Additionally, using Siegel as a barometer, it
is likely that the court will limit the plaintiffs’ right
to those profits realized solely from the domestic
exploitation of the joint copyright.66 This significantly
weakens the value of the reclaimed copyright, as a
considerable portion of the value derives from the
international film market.67 Although plaintiffs limit
their request to overseas profits predicated on the
exercise of the copyright in the United States, given
the clear language of the 1976 Act this may be murky
territory that the court decides to avoid.68
In addition to devaluation due to copyright
provisions, the applicable aspects of trademark law
might further devalue any recognition of termination
by the court.69 In the decades since characters such as
the X-Men or The Incredible Hulk burst onto the scene,
their appearances and related identifying characteristics
have become synonymous with the Marvel brand.
Further, these characters are extremely unique and
for the most part are in constant use, so the concepts
of genericide and loss through inactivity are not an
issue. Therefore, despite the termination by the Kirby
estate, the plaintiffs would be unable to produce works
featuring the distinct elements of the characters without
running afoul of Marvel’s trademark rights.70 This
reduces the alienability of the newly-reclaimed rights, as
well as places the Kirbys at a disadvantage should they
decide to renegotiate terms with Marvel.
All of this leads to the conclusion that even
though the court will likely find that the Kirby heirs
have properly asserted their termination right on
the original copyrights, the value of those rights are
significantly reduced. Simply looking at the derivative
rights exception, the reclamation will likely be limited
to only those characteristics of the superheroes present
65. See supra note 5.
66. See supra notes 35-38.
67. See, e.g., Box Office Mojo, X-Men Origins: Wolverine, http://
www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=wolverine.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010) (noting that the movie X-Men Origins: Wolverine
made $179,883,157 domestically and $193,179,412 internationally
for a total worldwide box office of $373,062,569).
68. § 304(c)(6)(E).
69. See supra notes 40-51.
70. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 274-75.

American University Intellectual Property Brief

15

in the original works. Given the nature of comic book
storytelling, these original creations are far different
from the heroes that grace present-day movie screens,
comic book pages, and videogames. It remains a
possibility that Marvel will argue, successfully, that the
relinquished copyrights are no longer as lucrative as
they once were, thus reducing the amount that Marvel
will be responsible for in accounting to the Kirby
estate. The copyright is further devalued when rights to
international profits are denied, as will likely be the case.

from its investments. Either way, it is clear that when
trademark law interferes with an author’s reclaimed
copyright, it undermines the intent of Congress and
undercuts the author’s ability to rightfully claim the
fruits of his hard work. Given the increasingly lucrative
nature of comic book-based branded entertainment,
Congress must revisit both trademark and copyright law
in order to ensure that the forefathers of the comic book
industry are properly recognized for their work.

When factoring in the additional constraints
trademark law places upon the usefulness of the
recaptured copyright, it appears as though the Kirby
estate is left with only two viable options: either relicense
the copyrights back to Marvel from a disadvantaged
bargaining position, or pump more money into litigating
the precise terms of the accounting between the parties.
Given that Disney now owns Marvel, in the likely event
that the court recognizes an effective termination of
copyright it would behoove the Kirbys to pursue the
former option with their corporate opposition. Given
the decreased bargaining strength that accompanies only
being able to negotiate with one corporate party, it is
unlikely that the Kirbys will reap the rewards they might
have without the interference of trademark law.
In 1958, Jack Kirby had no idea that his
creations would spawn a multibillion-dollar worldwide
industry. Congress enacted § 304(c) of the 1976 Act in
order to give authors, such as Mr. Kirby, the opportunity
to reap the benefits of the continued success of their
work.71 In the context of the comic book industry,
however, the competing interests of trademark law
significantly frustrate this goal. Rather than place the
author in an advanced bargaining position, trademark
law essentially eliminates the alienability of the reclaimed
copyright. This forces the author, or his heirs, to simply
renegotiate terms with the publisher from a position
of disadvantaged bargaining power. This frustrates the
intent of Congress in passing the 1976 Act.
V.

Conclusion

The battle of author versus publisher lacks the
stark dualism apparent in the pages of comic books,
in that its parties may not be easily classified as right
and wrong, benevolent and parsimonious, or good and
evil. While an author, or in many cases their estate, has
an undeniable interest in the success of their creations,
a publisher likewise possesses an interest in profiting
71. See supra note 18.
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Policing the Information Super Highway: Customs’ Role in Digital Piracy
By Andrew Haberman
I.

Introduction
As the role of web technology and instant
viral communication has permeated almost all sectors
of commerce and consumer daily life, some great
advantages have been dealt throughout the international
marketplace.1 While the Internet’s economic necessity
is evident in a business’s ability to reach consumers
and increase the efficiency of workflow, the duality of
this new tool is evident in the problems of security and
piracy. The profound effect on individual consumers
is clear when one considers the role of purchase power
online. Whereas in earlier
decades consumers might
have been limited by location,
availability and ability to
price out all of their options
or opportunities to find what
they want, the Internet has
completely decimated this
information and logistical
economic block. Today anyone
can look virtually anywhere
to find virtually anything
on the virtual marketplace
of the web, shifting the economic power from the
sellers to the masses. This shift is exacerbated by the
increased competition that pirated goods play in this
new unregulated market. As the world has entered the
digital age, so too have pirates, and this poses a major
obstacle to companies who build their business model
around intellectual property. The prevalent availability
of infringing goods, simplicity of acquiring these goods,
and shroud of anonymity provided by the Internet to the
seller makes the Internet a major obstacle for businesses
in the digital age. This infringing material can come
from anywhere in the world, and there is no easy
solution to this ubiquitous and expanding problem.

1. See Bus. Software Alliance, Software Piracy on the
Internet: A Threat To Your Security (2009), available at http://
global.bsa.org/internetreport2009/2009internetpiracyreport.pdf
(asserting that software and computers have become “indispensible
tools in our businesses, school and personal lives”).

In order to stem the growth of Internet piracy,
the United States must begin to protect its citizens and
businesses from pirated material, commencing with the
Department of Homeland Security’s Bureaus of Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) taking a larger role in
policing this offence at the United States’ cyber borders.2
This paper will argue that Customs must begin to work
with internet service providers (“ISPs”) in order to
police digitally transferred pirated copyrighted goods.
First, Part II will present a brief overview of how the
Internet, copyright rights, and
Customs’ authority currently
function. Next, Part III will argue
that Customs has the statutory
power to police the United States’
“e-borders,” that expanding
Customs’ role will be easier than
having the judiciary resolve
such disputes, and that allowing
Customs to monitor cyberspace
will achieve harmony with
multinational and national efforts
being made to stop digital piracy
worldwide. Finally, Part IV will conclude that in an
age of ever-evolving piracy, a combination of Customs
enforcement and encryption technologies will enable
the United States to battle pirates on what is and will
continue to be a major source of intellectual property
infringement.
II.

Background
The Growth of the Internet and Piracy

On any given day, more than 1.8 billion people
around the world use the Internet.3 With the declining
2. See Tom Spring, Surfing With U.S. Customs, CNN.COM,
Oct. 20, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9910/20/
us.customs.idg/ (reporting that Customs’ CyberSmuggling Center
had only $2 million, or .14%, of Customs’ $1.7 billion budget in
2000); See generally Andreas Manolopoulos, Raising ‘Cyber Borders’:
The Interaction Between Law and Technology, 11 Int’l J. of L. &
Info. Tech. 40-53 (2003).
3. See Internet World Stats, Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, available at http://www.internet
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cost of computer technology and the expansive nature of
its use, the Internet is rapidly growing. However, a large
portion of this growth is occurring in countries with
rampant piracy.4 In fact, much of this growth has come
in countries currently on the United States’ Special 301
Watch List, indicating that these countries have done an
insufficient job protecting intellectual property rights.5
Although the Special 301 reports are not directly linked
to Internet piracy specifically, there are indications that
countries with expanding Internet use are significantly
contributing to the growth of Internet piracy.6
The Internet, as it stands today, is an enduser driven technology: there are few “control points”
where a private or governmental organization can
monitor what material is being placed on the Internet.7
However, ISP’s, which allow users to access the Internet,
do have the capabilities of viewing, monitoring, and
even revoking a user’s Internet access.8 Since the
Internet is an end-user driven technology, any user
is free to create a website, whether for legal or illegal
purposes.9 While this has revolutionized the process
by which legitimate goods and services are distributed
throughout the world, it also allows any user to create
a site to distribute or sell counterfeit goods. This has
worldstats.com/stats.htm.
4. See Bus. Software Alliance, Sixth Annual BSA-IDC Global
software 08 Piracy Study (2009), available at http://images.
autodesk.com/adsk/files/globalpiracy2008.pdf; Internet World Stats,
supra note 3 (reporting user growth of 399% worldwide since 2000,
with growth rates as large as 1,675.1% in the Middle East.)
5. Compare Office of U.S. Trade Representative, 2009
Special 301 Report (Apr. 20, 2009) (listing, among others China,
Russia, Indonesia, Chile, and Pakistan on the Priority Watch List)
with Internet World Stats, supra note 3 (calculating user growth at
between 568% and 934% in the past decade for countries in the
same regions).
6. See Bus. Software Alliance, supra note 4 (despite the drop in
the rate of PC software piracy in 52% of the 110 countries studied,
global piracy has increased, indicating that piracy is growing so
quickly in some countries as to negate the progress made worldwide).
7. See Dan. L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy in Borders
in Cyberspace: Information policy and the Global Information Infrastructure, 205-34 at 206-07 (Brian Kahin & Charles
Nesson eds., MIT Press 1999) (describing how users communicate
through digital data packet switching on the Internet and control
their inputs).
8. Matt Jackson, Providing Safe Harbors for Speech: Internet Service
Providers and Copyright Law in Intellectual Property and
Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age,
307-320, at 307 (Peer K. Yu ed., Praeger 2007) (“[ISPs] are the
intermediaries that connect users to the Internet, allowing individuals to communicate.”).
9. See Burk, supra note 7 (describing the freedom users have on
the Internet).
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given rise to an infinite number of “businesses” who use
the web as both a communications tool and a global
marketplace for goods, in what is called e-commerce.
Illegal “e-businesses” range from sites providing for the
digital transfer of music and media to those allowing
the purchase of blatantly counterfeit goods, such as
copyrighted films on DVD. This widespread reality has
also affected consumers who are unaware of where their
funds go when they unintentionally purchase counterfeit
goods over the Internet.
Piracy over the Internet occurs primarily in two
forms. First, tangible goods are purchased over the
Internet with electronically transferred funds, and then
the goods are shipped to the consumer.10 These goods
range from illegal copies of goods protected by copyright
(like movies or CDs) to pharmaceuticals which infringe
American patents (like generic forms of Viagra). Second,
an infringing good may be transferred digitally over the
Internet through “digital piracy.” There is no question
that CBP may assert its authority over counterfeit goods
shipped into the United States, regardless of how these
good were purchased, but the second type of Internet
piracy raises many more legal concerns.11 Since the
vast majority of patented and trademarked goods are
physical and cannot be digitally transferred, digital
piracy primarily concerns copyrights.12 As such, the
primary industries affected by strictly digital piracy are
the entertainment and software industries.
The Rights of Copyright Holders
Since copyrights comprise the majority of
the intellectual property illegally transferred over the
Internet in digital piracy, it is important to understand
the rights that copyright holders are afforded when
they produce a work. First, in order to be afforded
these rights, an author must create a work that is
10. See Brooks Barnes, Fox Files More Suits Claiming DVD Piracy,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2010) available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/02/04/fox-files-more-suits-against-alleged-dvdpirates/ (filing suits against individuals selling pirated DVDs on
auction sites); CpTech.org, Priority Watch Country: Jordan, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/phrma/301-99/jordan.html
(reporting Jordan’s involvement in pirating pharmaceuticals).
11. See 17 U.S.C. §603(c) (2006) (giving Customs authority to
seize piratical or possibly piratical copies).
12. But see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 1, 3 (2010) (slip op.) (holding business methods patentable, and thus, increasing the amount of
electronically transferable patents); see also Debora J. Halbert, Intellectual Property in the Information Age: The Politics of
Expanding Ownership Right, at 51-56 (Quorum Books 1999)
(documenting the classification of programs as creative works).
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capable of being copyrighted.13 This requirement is
not very stringent and merely requires that the author
has produced a work with a modicum of creativity
that is fixed in some medium.14 In digital context, this
“fixation” requirement becomes a source of debate, but
in the United States, digital files have been determined
to be a fixation.15 If an author creates a copyrightable
work, the Copyright Act identifies the six exclusive
rights of the creator as the rights to: reproduce, adapt,
distribute, publicly display, and publicly perform a
copyrighted work, along with, in the case of sound
recordings, the right to perform the digital transmission
publicly.16 Further, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ensures the “protection of copyright owners against
the unauthorized access to their encrypted copyrighted
works.”17 This makes the use of “circumvention
devices” illegal.18 Thus if anyone copies, adapts,
distributes, displays, or performs a copyrighted work
without a license to do so, they are guilty of copyright
infringement and the copyright owner maintains the
right to prosecute these offenses. For their part, ISPs
have been given limited liability for any infringement
occurring on their servers since they are not actually
violating these rights.19
Industries built around copyright protection,
such as the entertainment industry, are able to subsist
because the authors of works control the aforementioned
exclusive rights to their works. Copyrights are granted
in order to reward authors for the hard work they have
put into their work, whether they have put months of
13. See Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (allowing a copyright if the author showed
some creativity, regardless of other works already granted copyrights).
14. See 17 U.S.C.A § 101 (2006) (“[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”).
15. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works And Fixation:
is Galoob A Mirage, or Does The Form(gen) of the Alleged Derivative
Work Matter?, 20 Santa Clara Comp. & High Tech. L J. 991
(2003-04).
16. 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006).
17. Pub. L. 105-304, Stat. 2860 §5(C) (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. at §1201).
18. See id.
19. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 927-28
(2005) (an intermediary cannot be held liable unless they knowingly
contribute to infringement); see also Jackson, supra note 8 (noting
that ISPs do not commit the infringement, but instead their users
do, thus, if anything ISPs could be charged as secondarily liable).

research and writing into publishing a book or millions
of dollars into creating a new type of animation for
filmmaking. Without these protections, anyone who
so desired would be able to watch a copyrighted movie
for free on the Internet, and the incentive to innovate,
or even to produce works would be significantly
decreased.20 Movies like “Avatar”,which employ cutting
edge technology never before seen on a movie screen,
would no longer be created, and the general public will
suffer as a whole.21 The movie, music, and software
industries base their business models on copyright
protections, and if these protections are not effectively
enforced, the incentive to innovate is lost.
Customs’ Authority
The Department of Homeland Security’s
Bureaus of Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
protect against the importation of goods infringing
intellectual property rights.22 However, Customs faces
a unique task in protecting copyrighted works, as these
works are no longer required to be registered under the
Berne Convention.23 To combat this problem, Customs
allows copyright holders to record their copyrights
with Customs, which assists them in protecting the
owner’s intellectual property. Under their enforcement
authority, Customs may seize any “clearly piratical
works” or works that are “substantially similar” to a
copyrighted work.24 Customs will generally make
decisions regarding the legality of an imported work
independently, but if the Customs Office, the IPR
20. See Halbert, supra note 13, at 26-27 (noting that the
National Writers Guild identified Internet piracy as a problem that
“must be dealt with before is safe for intellectual property”); Peter
Sciretta, The most Pirated Movies of 2009 and Avatar: The Making of Bootleg, Slashfilm, Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.slashfilm.
com/2009/12/27/the-most-pirated-movies-of-2009-and-avatarthe-making-of-the-bootleg/ (citing ChartsBin, Top 10 Most Pirated
Movies of 2009, Jan. 2010, http://chartsbin.com/view/3w3) (showing highly pirated movies to be downloaded tens of thousands of
times).
21. Michael Cieply, A Movie’s Budget Pops From the Screen,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2009 available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/11/09/business/media/09avatar.html (questioning
whether Avatar was capable of making back its money in the current
entertainment environment).
22. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 602-03 (2006) (copyright law) (providing statutory authority for CBP and ICE to protect copyrighted
works from infringing imported works).
23. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221,§14 (1977).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (a)-(b) (seizure authority for violations
of 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (copyright statue).
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Branch, or the courts issue a ruling, Customs must abide
by the decision.25 In addition to the statutory language,
Customs is guided by the Copyright Directive, which
is used as a step-by-step guide by customs lawyers to
enforce copyrights at the borders.26
By its own policy, Customs must follow a
specific set of steps upon making a determination of
copyright infringement.27 First, Customs notifies the
importer of the alleged infringement if they decide to
detain an import. If the importer files a timely denial,
Customs will then notify the copyright owner, and if
the copyright owner files a written request asking for the
materials to remain detained, the importer is afforded
an opportunity to submit a brief on his or her behalf.28
While Customs protects the U.S. from infringing works
at the borders, ICE has statutory authority to commence
criminal investigations for infractions of Title 18
criminal intellectual property infringement.29 ICE may
initiate a criminal investigation if they have probable
cause to believe that a crime involving copyrights, such
as willful infringement, has been committed under
Section 2319. ICE works with the FBI, National IPR
Center and the DOJ to prosecute criminal individuals
or organizations “responsible for producing, smuggling,
and distributing counterfeit products.”30
III.

Analysis
Although there are not statistics on the precise
amount of losses as a result of digital piracy, it is clear
that piracy has had an enormous effect on industries
built around copyright protection.31 The Business
25. See Timothy P. Trainer & Vicki E. Allums, Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights Across Borders (ed. 2009) 448
(West 2009) (although there is no set analysis, Customs employs a
quasi-judicial analysis in making infringement decisions).
26. See id. at 309-28 (supplying the text of the directive).
27. 19 C.F.R. 133.43 (2009); See generally id. at §133.43(b) (listing the information that must disclosed in each step of this process).
28. See id at §133.43(d).
29. See 18 U.S.C. §2319 (2006). See also id. §2318 (trademarks).
30. See http://www.ice.gov/pi/cornerstone/ipr/index.htm. While
ICE’s authority extends beyond the Internet, the National IPR
focuses explicitly on Internet crimes and instead focuses on crimes
with an international nexus, unlike the FBI. Due to the growth of
cyber crime and Internet piracy, the DOJ has created the Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section (“CCIPS”) to handle the
prosecution of these type of crimes. Thus, it is extremely important
for these agencies to work together and share information while
prosecuting cyber crime.
31. See Spring, supra note 2 (estimating that U.S. business lose
$10 billion per year to computer related crime); Halbert supra,
note 16 at 83 (Documenting the $1 billion sanction place on China
in 1995 for failure to protect products ranging from Disney’s Lion
King to Microsoft’s computer programs).
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Software Alliance estimates that the software industry
experienced $53 billion in losses worldwide in 2008, but
this is not strictly limited to digital transfer.32 Similarly,
the recording industries have also experienced a flood
of digital piracy and have engaged in a myriad of tactics
to try to stop the piracy. First, the recording industry
began suing end users who allegedly stole music.33
However, this plan proved expensive, ineffective, and
generally unhelpful. Instead the recording industry,
represented by the Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”), has been attempting to negotiate
with ISPs in order to find a more effective solution to
halting digital piracy.34 The RIAA has furthered these
efforts by requesting subpoenas under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in a bid to
seek out consumers suspected of using peer-to-peer file
sharing technology for alleged copyright infringement.35
Private negotiations between the recording
industry and the ISPs will most likely prove ineffective
without government involvement. However, a solution
involving Customs might be able to curb the problem
by preventing infringing files from entering the United
States, and importantly, there is no limiting statutory
language to prevent Customs from getting involved.
Customs involvement will also avoid the problems that
copyright owners face in civil lawsuits and provide an
impartial arbiter to ISP infringement determinations.
A.

Customs Has the Authority to Seize
Illegal Digital Transfers Entering the
United States

Customs regulations define infringing copies as
“piratical articles, i.e., copies or phonorecords which are
unlawfully made (without authorization of the copyright
owner)” and importation of these copies is prohibited.36
There is nothing in these rules limiting a copy to a
physical copy, and further, there is nothing limiting
importation to a physical import. As stated in Caminetti
v. United States, “[i]t is elementary that the meaning
of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in
the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
32. See Bus. Software Alliance, supra note 1 (reporting from a
study on 110 countries).
33. See Sara Mcbride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 2008 available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g. RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc. 351 F. 3d 1229
(D.C .Cir. 2003).
36. 19 C.F.R. §133.41(a), (b).
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plain... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.”37 Since the natural meaning of
“import” is “to bring from a foreign or external source”,
there is no reason to exclude digital transfers across
cyber borders.38 Similarly, the maxim noscitur a sociis
requires that when a word is ambiguous, its meaning be
determined by reference to the rest of the statute.39 In
this case, the word “copies” is as unknown, as the word
“import,” when the statue is read without reference to
other documents. Since the courts have determined that
a pirated song in a digital format can be an infringing
copy, it should follow that importing an infringing
digital file should qualify as an infringement.40
Although Customs is already spread thin in its
efforts to enforce intellectual property rights and protect
American borders, Customs should be able to utilize
ISPs to ease the load. ISPs are capable of monitoring the
Internet for infringing conduct and have been able to do
so in the past.41 Further, other countries have successfully
implemented e-borders monitors for certain material,
and although this may be simpler than patrolling for
any infringing material, it proves that monitoring in
some capacity is certainly possible.42 For example,
France has worked with ISPs to prevent French Internet
surfers from accessing Nazi memorabilia on Yahoo!’s
auction site, while China has been censoring the results
of Google searches for Chinese users.43 ISP monitoring
37. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
38. “Import.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.. MerriamWebster Online, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/import.
39. Arecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)
(implementing noscitur a sociis, which literally means “ [the] word is
known by the company it keeps”) .
40. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d
896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding Napster liable for distributing digital
copies of songs); see also Robert C. Piasentin, Unlawful? Innovative?
Unstoppable?: A Comparative Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability
Facing P2P End-Users in the United States, United Kingdom, and
Canada, 14 Int’l J. L. & Info. Tech. 95 (2006).
41. See Martin Charles Gloumbic, Fighting Terror Online:
The Convergence of Security, Technology, and the Law, at
148-149 (Springer 2008) (documenting monitoring software such
as Echelon and sniffers like the Carnivore program which utilizes
ISPs to monitor Internet activity for specific information it is programmed to look for).
42. See id. at 4-5 (pointing out the difference in a user’s Internet
experience in France, Korea, Italy and China).
43. See LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. (County Court, Paris, Nov. 20,
2000, available at http:www.lapres.net/yahen11.html (prohibiting the sale of Nazi memorabilia oh Yahoo!’s website in France);
The Official Google Blog, A New Approach to China: Update,
March 22, 2010, http://googleblog.blogspot.cowm/2010/03/newapproach-to-china-update.html (announcing that Google removed

can be supplemented by ICE investigations and will
not only work to discourage digital piracy, but should
also curb piracy in tangible goods by supplying ICE
with tangible leads to piratical organizations.44 Since the
world is moving digital, this will finally allow customs to
move ahead of pirates who employ sophisticated hacking
techniques.
It is important to note that although a CBP
monitoring system will be essential to preventing
digitally pirated goods from entering the United States,
additional ICE action will be crucial in enforcing
intellectual property rights. Almost seventy-five percent
of the pirated goods shipped into the United States as
a result of an Internet transaction come from auction
sites.45 Auction sites attempt to implement monitoring
systems, but it is very hard to determine which goods are
infringing.46 Even Customs’ monitoring will be unable
to detect when infringing products are sold while being
advertised as legitimate, showing the need for traditional
CBP and ICE border measures and investigations,
respectively, to prevent infringing physical goods from
entering the United States.
In order to truly comprehend the value of
Customs’ role in preventing digital piracy, it also critical
to examine the proposed monitoring system’s limitations.
Two readily apparent limitations of such a plan are: (1)
end-user’s privacy concerns could limit the scope of
monitoring; and (2) new pirating methods could render
this enforcement method useless. Implementation of
a monitoring system will require a careful balancing of
privacy and copyright owners’ rights, but there are some
examples that can be looked to in achieving this balance.
For example, the courts have ruled that the
FBI Carnivore program, which monitors web activity,
is constitutional, and this logic could similarly be

monitors in response to cyber attack suspected to have originated
from the Chinese government).
44. See, e.g., Joseph W. Cormier et. al., Intellectual Property Crimes,
46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 761 (2009) (noting that together Customs,
the DOJ and the FBI, through the “Joint Piracy Initiative” and
operations such as “Site Down” and “D-Elite” have already began
cracking down on Internet piracy of copyrighted goods).
45. See Internet Crime Complaint Ctr., 2009 Internet
Crime Report (Mar. 12, 2010) available at http://www.ic3.gov /
media/annualreport/2009_IC3Report.pdf. (336,655 complaints
and $559.7 million lost to internet crime in 2009).
46. See EBay,The Verified Rights Owner Program (VERO) ,
http://pages.ebay.com /tradingassistants/TA_Education_VERO.pdf
(describing EBay’s policy to remove infringing material).
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applied to an ISP monitoring systems for Customs.47
Although national security is of a higher social value
than protecting the record and software industry, these
industries are essential to the American economy and
have become a major concern in American foreign
policy.48 Further, one can assume that if Customs starts
to monitor e-borders, pirates will likely either find ways
to circumvent this system or attempt new methods of
piracy. For example, pirates could just pre-load iPods
with thousands of pirated songs and movies, enter the
United States, and distribute pirated materials this way.49
Since this proposed system would not be able to combat
piracy within the United States, physical transport of
files into the United States would be able to circumvent
the monitoring system. However, with the majority of
piracy occurring in developing countries, this would be
a step in the right direction towards preventing massive
future piracy.50 Monitoring ISPs for digital piracy
would, at the least, begin to bring enforcement measures
up to speed with the measures implemented by pirates
and begin to solve the rampant problem of digital piracy.
The RIAA and Business Software Alliance
(“BSA”) both support a monitoring system that uses
ISPs as a control point, but they both realize that this
cannot be accomplished privately without eroding
end-users rights.51 Thus, Customs’ involvement will
give end-users due process and an impartial arbiter to
determine if an end-user has truly infringed a copyright.
Furthermore, neither the end-users nor the ISPs need
to be punished, as infringing material can simply be
seized and destroyed. ICE will be able to follow up and
pursue any criminal sanctions while the RIAA pursues
civil action, but if the industry can prevent piracy, it
is unlikely the RIAA will sue when the rewards do not
47. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American
Civil Procedure: Cases and Commentary, 52 (8th ed., Thompson West 2007) (1980) (noting that in “full collection” mode the
Carnivore system violates the Fourth Amendment, but in “pen
collection” mode, which can monitor file transfer, the system is
constitutional under the USA Patriot Act).
48. See id. (noting that the Patriot Act was passed in response to
September 11th). But see Transcript, Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2009, available at: http://www .nytimes.
com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html (showing the
importance of science as President Obama stated, “We will restore
science to its rightful place.”).
49. See EConsultancy, Internet Statistics Compendium 2010
(Feb. 2010), available at http://econsultancy.com/ reports/internetstatistics-compendium (reporting that 38% of Gen Y users have an
iPhone or iPod touch).
50. See supra notes 7-9, and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Bus. Software Alliance, supra note 1 at 19 (BSA
opposes termination of ISP services without due process).
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justify the costs.
B.

Problems With Private and Judicial
Solutions
By abandoning the strategy of suing individual
copyright infringers and beginning to work with ISPs to
monitor the Internet, the recording industry has shown
the type of forward thinking that will be required to
thwart digital piracy. However, the recording industry
seemed to abandon this plan without an effective
substitute in place. Copyright holders in all industries,
including the recording industry, have attempted
to slow piracy through Digital Rights Management
(“DRM”) but this technology has been of little obstacle
for pirates.52 Pirates are not just children sitting at their
computers downloading a free song but are instead
highly organized groups working to make movies, music,
software and other digital files available for free on the
Internet.53 Pirates have consistently been either one
step ahead or capable of circumventing technological
safeguards such as DRMs and have left industries reliant
on copyright protection grasping for answers.54
One possible answer is a private agreement
which monitors end-user Internet activity and allows
the record company to unilaterally shut down Internet
service if infringement occurs. However, any such
program will still require an accompanying civil lawsuit
and will likely violate the constitutional freedoms of
speech and privacy, especially without an impartial
decision maker to determine when a user has acted
illegally.55 Second, it will be questionable if American
courts can even establish jurisdiction, and if they can,
52. See, e.g., Golumbic, supra note 34 at 78-79 (citing Junger v.
Daley, United States Secretary of Commerce 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir.
2000)) (demonstrating the failure of DRMs by pointing out that
a Norwegian teenager was able to write a program that rendered
the film industry’s investment in a DRM, known as “Contents
Scramble System,” ineffective).
53. See Where’s The Beef?, A Guide to Internet Piracy, 2006
Hacker Quarterly Summer 2004 , available at http://web.archive.
org/web/20070512002747/old.wheresthebeef.co.uk/show.php/
guide/2600_Guide_to_Internet_Piracy-TYDJ.txt (describing the
intricate ranking and distribution employed for piracy).
54. Wired.com, The Shadow Internet, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/13.01/topsite_pr.html; Michael Warnecke, To Rid
Wed of Counterfeit Goods, Rights Holders Turn to Multi-Prong Attack,
72 Patent, Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)31 (May 2006)
(documenting the failed attempts of police to stop digital piracy).
55. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace in Borders
in Cyberspace: Information policy and the Global Information Infrastructure, 164-202 at 167-78 (Brian Kahin & Charles
Nesson eds., MIT Press 1999) (discussing the problems with
traditional jurisdiction over digital piracy and suggesting the use of a
‘Virtual Arbiter’).
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the courts must determine which law to apply for
cases involving foreign infringement.56 These decisions
take time, money, and manpower that is unnecessary.
Considering that infringement of American copyrights
is occurring worldwide, any private action against
foreign infringers will be severely limited. Customs, on
the other hand, will not have jurisdictional problems,
as Customs has authority over imports and can apply
American law to the digital imports identically to how
Customs applies the law to physical imports.
First, if an infringer is foreign, it will be
extremely hard for the court to assert jurisdiction.
When determining jurisdiction in Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the court was
only able to establish jurisdiction under the doctrine
of specific jurisdiction, asserting that the defendants’
distribution of the infringing software was the ‘but for’
cause of the alleged infringement.57 This jurisdictional
determination has been criticized for establishing
attenuated jurisdiction, and the court even recognized
that viewing an infringing website’s content would
typically not give rise to specific jurisdiction.58 Even if
a private agreement between copyright holder and ISPs
was finalized, once an infringing use was found, remedy
would need to be sought through federal courts, and
establishing jurisdiction in each and every case will be a
difficult and expensive endeavor. In contrast, Customs
should not have any problems establishing jurisdiction as
it has enforcement power over imported items.
Second, the adjudicating court must determine
which law to apply to the case at hand. The Berne
Convention requires national treatment, which requires
the court to afford the same protection to foreign
copyright holders as they would afford to national
authors.59 Further, article 5.2 of the Berne Convention
calls for the adjudicating court to apply the law of
56. See generally Computer Science and Telecommunications
Board for the National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma:
Intellectual Property In the Information Age at 54-61 (analyzing
the complexities involved in adjudicating copyright disputes with
respect to multiple national laws).
57. 243 F. Supp.2d 1073, 1085 (C.D. Cal 2003) (“[the] second
prong of jurisdictional analysis is met if, but for the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the cause of action would
not have arisen”).
58. See id. See also Eliza Shardlow Clark, Online Music Sharing
in a Global Economy: The U.S. Effort to Command (or Survive) The
Tidal Wave, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 141 (Winter, 2004) at 148
(criticizing the court’s exercise of jurisdiction for only conducting a
cursory analysis).
59. Berne Convention, supra note 24 at 5.1.

the member country where protection is claimed.60
However, this convention was crafted when copies were
created successively, one country at a time, in tangible
copies, not when infringement was occurring over the
Internet. Internet piracy allows copies to be made in
many countries simultaneously, and article 5.2 would
require the court to apply the laws of every country in
which a copy was made.61 This is not only difficult,
but time consuming, costly and extremely confusing.
In contrast, Customs has designated regulations and
generally follows the ruling of the American courts when
determining if an import is infringing.62
Finally, if copyright holding industries and ISPs
enter into a private agreement, without government
assistance, any enforcement actions taken will be made
without affording the infringer due process and will not
allow users to defend themselves. Customs currently
implements a notice system which affords the infringer
an opportunity to fight the decision. Further, Customs
decisions are made by impartial lawyers who have
experience determining whether a good is infringing.
If ISPs were to make unilateral decisions to shut off
Internet services based on infringing activity, Internet
users could be improperly banned from access. This is
especially important considering fair use. The careful
balance between copyright owners’ rights and fair
uses must be respected, and this balance will not be
struck if independent determinations of infringement
are excluded from ISP service decisions. The law is
ever-evolving, especially with regards to copyright in
cyberspace, so it is important to have a responsive agency
or law making body, such as Customs, involved in
infringement determinations in order to properly reflect
any changes in the law.
C.
Current Efforts
Around the globe there have been some efforts
to include ISPs and to begin to monitor Internet activity.
On the international level, the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) negotiations have been
ongoing and are a major source of debate.63 However,
60. Berne Convention, supra at 5.2 (lex loci protectionis).
61. See id; See also Racquel Xalabarder, Copyright: Choice of Law
and Jurisdiction in the Digital Age. 8 INT’L COMP. L. 79 (2002).
62. See supra, notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
63. See e.g., Electronic Frontier Found., The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, available at http://www.eff.org/issues/
acta (arguing that ACTA will violate Internet users’ rights). The
ACTA is such a source of controversy that an entire paper could be
devoted to this subject alone, but for the purposes of this paper it is
important to note that ACTA negotiations have allegedly covered
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this agreement has been negotiated in secrecy, so any
speculation as to what ACTA will require is based off
of alleged leaks, unconfirmed allegations, or brief fact
sheets. Additionally, in Europe, the European Council
has issued non-binding directives trying to solve the
digital piracy problem. Finally, on a national level, many
countries have implemented policies to try to combat
digital piracy, most notably France’s HODAPI law
which attempted to enact a three strike policy.64
There are theories that ACTA will require a
three-strike rule similar to the HODAPI law in France.65
However, without government enforcement, any policy
adopted in the US will be devoid of due process and
thus likely unconstitutional. Further, the United States
Trade Representative (“USTR”) has stated that one of
the goals of ACTA is to “establish enforcement practices
that promote strong intellectual property protection in
coordination with right holders and trading partners.”66
The USTR further stated that areas for possible
provisions include criminal enforcement, border
measures, and Internet distribution and information
technology, among others.67 Allowing Customs to
take an expanded role in Interment enforcement
would address all of these areas while promoting
strong intellectual property protection in coordination
with rights holders as well as trade partners. Further,
ACTA will allegedly include some version of a global
DMCA which should include terms that require ISPs
to “put in place policies to deter unauthorized storage
and transmission of IP infringing content.”68 If these
allegations are truly what will be included in the
ACTA, then an expanded role for Customs in Internet
ISP cooperation and the enforcement of intellectual property rights
over the Internet.
64. See Nate Anderson, France passes harsh anti-P2P three-strikes
law, ArsTechnica.com, available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/09/france-passesharsh-anti-p2p-three-strikes-law-again.ars.
65. See, e.g., Michael Geist, The EU ACTA Consultation: European
Commission vs. European Parliament, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4894/125/ (fearing a three strike policy
in ACTA).
66. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file760_15084.pdf.
67. See id. A concern might be that trading partners begin to rely
on the United States to enforce intellectual property rights and relax
on enforcement efforts within their own borders.
68. Gwen Hinze, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Electronic Frontier Foundation, available at http://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2009/11/leaked-acta-internet-provisions-three-strikesand-.
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enforcement will begin to accomplish these goals
and will offer a model of enforcement for countries
worldwide.
Next, Europe has taken actions which indicate
global support for an increased Customs role in
monitoring the e-borders. Although there is no such
thing as “European copyright law,” the European
Council has published directives to guide national
lawmaking.69 For example, the Enforcement Directive
requires member states to apply effective, dissuasive,
proportionate, fair and equitable measures, procedures
and remedies against those engaged in counterfeiting
and piracy, such as ensuring implementation of access
to evidence.70 Although the E-Commerce Directive
prohibits Member States from imposing general
obligations to monitor ISPs, it allows Member States
to establish obligations where ISPs promptly inform
authorities of the identities of recipients of their service
with storage agreements.71 Additionally, the recently
approved “Telecoms Package” requires ISPs to comply
with the Enforcement Directive.72 This contradictory
language epitomizes the most controversial issue with
monitoring the Internet: balancing privacy and freedom
of expression against the rights of copyright owners.
While an expanded Customs role in policing
digital piracy might conflict with the E-Commerce
Directive, it is in line with the newly approved
“Telecoms Package.” Under the E-Commerce
Directive, Customs would essentially be acting as “the
authority” to which violating storage service would be
reported to. Although it is not essential that a plan
allowing Customs to monitor digital imports align with
European Directives, a plan that does so will help ACTA
negotiations working to improve global enforcement.
69. See P. Sean Morris, Pirates of the Internet, at Intellectual Property’s End With Torrents and Challenges for Choice of Law 17 Int’l J.
of L. & Info. Tech. (2009) (canvassing the European Directives).
70. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, Official Journal of the European Union L 195/16, 2
June, 2004. (aiming to harmonize Member States legislations, so IP
owners may enjoy an equivalent level of protection in the European
market).
71. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), Official Journal C 178,
17.07.2000, p.1. at Article 15.
72. Press Release, Telecoms Package: EU-Wide Spectrum Management for Full Benefits of Wireless Services, July 7, 2008, (Telecoms
Package was adopted, requiring ISPs to comply with the Enforcement Directive).
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Regardless of Customs’ compliance with European
Directives, the contradictory nature of the European
Directives highlights the fact that any solution must
carefully consider privacy and due process in addition to
copyright owners’ rights.
Finally, any plan to allow Customs to take
an increased role in thwarting digital piracy can be
molded around plans that have been invoked on a
national level around the globe. First, in France, the
Olivennes Agreement was formed between the film
industry, music industry, and ISP’s devising a gradual
punishment approach.73 This was quickly struck down,
but eventually led to a three-strike approach abbreviated
in France as HODAPI. HODAPI was also struck
down by the courts, in part for failing to afford citizens
due process.74 The court found that any punishment
removing Internet access would require judicial
adjudication, not administrative proceedings which
assume guilt.75 These rulings may seem fatal to any plan
in the United States excluding the judiciary, however,
Customs’ system for evaluating possible infringement is
more than just a determination and allows individuals
to submit briefs defending their position.76 Further,
Customs is bound by the law of the courts and enforces
the laws of the United States. 77 As such, Customs
should be able to work with ISPs to police digital piracy
and by doing so Customs will be in line with the goals
of ACTA, in harmony with the current European
Directives and can avoid the past problems seen on a
national level like those seen in France.

growing at an outstanding rate, and every day billions
of users worldwide access the Internet. In the United
States, the Internet is a vital aspect of everyday life
andrepresents the imminent future of many developing
countries. It is time for the United States to finally get
ahead of pirates and take enforcement efforts to the
Internet while it is still able to do so in a cost-effective
and efficient manner. Although Customs will not be
able to completely stop digital piracy, it is a start that
will give the United States vital experience in dealing
with the digital piracy of tomorrow. Involving Customs
will avoid the traditional problems seen in federal courts,
and seems to be a solution that ACTA and the rest of
the world would favor. Pirates will keep coming up
with new methods for stealing copyrighted material,
so enforcement measures must evolve concurrently.
However, the United States cannot wait until pirates
reach a plateau; Customs should begin to police digital
piracy today.

IV.
Conclusion
Due to the massive amount of piracy occurring
throughout the world, action must be taken in some
form to protect copyright owners. The Internet is
73. O. DUMONS, «Mission Olivennes: signature de l’accord
sur fond de grincements de dents», Le Monde, 23 novembre
2007; http:// www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/index-olivennes231107.htm. (requiring the ISP to send a warning to a client
upon detecting infringing activities, and if the user repeats his
crime, the user risks having Internet suspended or shut down by the
ISP and his name blacklisted).
74. See Nate Anderson, French Court Savages “Three-Strikes” Law,
Tosses It Out, ArsTechnica.com, available at http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/french-court-savages-3-strikes-lawtosses-it-out.ars (reporting that HODAPI passed on second attempt
but was tossed out by the courts).
75. Id. (“The Council’s censure appears to mean that disconnections—a penalty that the industry says is essential—must be treated
like court cases, not “you’re probably guilty” administrative proceedings.”).
76. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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Copyrights and the Fashion Industry: A Love-Hate Relationship?
By Ashlee Hodge

This piece was originally featured as a column at www.ipbrief.net. Columns explore various
intellectual property law issues in a journalistic format, providing a detailed overview of the
subject.
Earlier this month, Senator Charles Schumer (a
Democrat unsurprisingly from fashion-capital New
York) introduced the Innovative Design Protection and
Piracy Prevention Act (S. 3728) to the delight of many
fashion industry players and the dismay of some fashion
industry law and economic theorists and skeptics.

the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s design is
“substantially identical,” such that a purchaser could
easily mistake the defendant’s design for the original.
Third, the defendant must have had the opportunity to
have seen the original design before the alleged copy was
released for distribution.

This proposed bill, the newest draft of a plethora of
preceding failed bills, has created quite a stir in the
fashion industry due to the lack of any copyright law
in the American fashion industry to date. While its
immediate predecessor, the
Design Piracy Protection
Act, would have reportedly
destroyed up to 90% of
design business,1 the new
and improved IDPPPA
has successfully pleased
two chief organizations in
the industry, the AAFA
(American Apparel and
Footwear Association)
and the CFDA (Council
of Fashion Designers of
America) by increasing
the bill’s specificity, more narrowly tailoring the scope of
protection, and raising the bar for plaintiffs bringing a
copyright infringement lawsuit.

Furthermore, other stipulations in the IDPPPA
demonstrate its narrower scope. The bill grants only
a short three-year term of protection beginning from
the point at which the item is publicly displayed, and
every design created before
the enactment of this bill will
remain in the public domain.
Retailers and consumers
cannot be liable for buying or
selling illegal copies without
knowledge of their illegality,
and there is also a provision
that allows home sewers to
copy a protected design for
private use by themselves or a
family member.

For example, under the bill a plaintiff has a threepronged burden of proof in order for a case to go to
trial. First, the plaintiff must prove that their design is “a
unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian
variation over prior designs,” and that it is an entirely
new concept that had not previously existed. Second,
1. Proposed law to destroy 90% of design businesses. http://www.
fashion-incubator.com/archive/proposed-law-to-destroy-90-ofdesign-businesses/

26

While the IDPPPA’s
numerous and detailed conditions seem to have been
made in consideration of many different sides of the
fashion industry, some commentators have expressed
skepticism when applying the IDPPPA to the bigger
fashion industry picture. Kal Raustiala and Chris
Sprigman, professors at UCLA Law School and UVA
Law School, respectively, assert that the philosophy
behind intellectual property law actually demands
looking at the big picture rather than focusing in on a
solely protectionist agenda. They state that there must
be evidence of systematic harm throughout any industry
looking to protect its intellectual property, and in the
case of the fashion industry, there simply isn’t enough
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harm across the board.
Not only is there a supposed lack of harm, but Raustiala
and Sprigman have argued that the fashion industry in
the United States has in fact thrived specifically in part
because of its lack of intellectual property regulations,
and that the ability to copy work directly adds to the
industry’s economic success. Earlier this year, the
two wrote in a New York Times article stating, “The
interesting effect of copying is to generate more demand
for new designs, since the old designs—the ones that
have been copied—are no longer
special. The overall result is
greater sales of apparel. We call
this surprising effect the ‘piracy
paradox.’”
An item of clothing, for example,
is often deemed fashionable
precisely because of its high rate
of copying, or “trending,” to
put it in a less IP-offensive way.
Fashion designers constantly
borrow ideas they see in other
designers’ works and build off of
one another for inspiration. And
because there are constantly the
Forever 21-type stores and Uggs imitations, designers
are pushed forward into creating new trend cycles,
ultimately renewing the industry over and over again
on a much faster scale than with other regulation-heavy
industries.
Secondly, consumers have an immense benefit to a
fashion industry unregulated by intellectual property
provisions. The latest fashion trends are not limited to
only the wealthy when copying is allowed. Raustiala
and Sprigman go so far as to state, “copying has played a
major role in democratizing fashion.”
As pointed out in a TED Talk specifically on the fashion
industry’s ability to flourish without copyright, from an
economic perspective, the large majority of the clientele
for “knock-off” purses is distinct from the customers
who are able to make significant contributions to the
labels who produce the originals. Should the knock-offs
be outlawed, labels like Gucci and Fendi would unlikely
have a noteworthy gain in customers.

protection. Fashion designers and comedians alike have
designed many of their products and jokes so that they
simply don’t work when produced by someone else. An
intricate Vera Wang bridal dress is as difficult to perfectly
recreate as a Larry David joke—a duplicate just isn’t
quite the same as when it comes from the original.
The IDPPPA does have much stricter rules on what
constitutes a copy than its predecessors, but this has
critics wondering if the bill will have much of any real,
noticeable impact. However, Raustiala and Sprigman
have pointed out that regardless
of what the bill itself says, simply
putting a law like this in the
hands of lawyers and judges
is a dangerous concept. They
note patterns in copyright law
indicating that plaintiffs’ lawyers
are fully capable of making
creative arguments which
often induce or allow judges to
interpret the language in certain
bills quite expansively.
A major concern is the
likelihood of those independent
designers, truly in need of
copyright protection, ultimately going up against the
more powerful giants who can easily afford the best
IP attorneys money has to offer. And instead of a
specialized federal agency making the determination (as
the case is for patent infringement) this bill will call for
judges to assess fashion designs, who, bless their hearts,
have little knowledge or interest in keeping up with
fashion trends. (This of course does not account for the
obvious exception.)
One of the main concepts behind the implementation
of copyright law is the relationship between ownership
and incentive to innovate. But in such a richly creative
industry where the high competition to innovate has
produced a constantly evolving palate for consumers
who happily participate, is it really a good idea to get the
very complicated and often unfair process of copyright
involved?

The same TED Talk goes on to give credence to the
industries and art forms that similarly lack copyright
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Unconstitutional Excess, and other Recent Copyright Developments
By Ali Sternburg

This piece was originally featured as a column at www.ipbrief.net. Columns explore various
intellectual property law issues in a journalistic format, providing a detailed overview of the
subject.
On July 9, 2010, in Sony v. Tenenbaum,1 Boston federal
judge Nancy Gertner gave a multifaceted ruling that
made things slightly less abysmal for the scapegoat
music pirate, and potentially a lot worse for the major
record labels and their Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) confederates. In the latest development
of Sony v. Tenenbaum, Judge Gertner reduced the labels’
statutory damages awards that were to be paid by Joel
Tenenbaum, who was convicted of file sharing by a jury
last July.2 She
decreased the
damages from
$675,000 to
$67,500,3 using
reasoning that
was partially
based on
slightly arbitrary
mathematics,4 partially influenced by a very similar
precedent (Virgin Records America v. Thomas5), and
partially reluctantly constitutional.6
1. Sony v. Tenenbaum, Memorandum & Order Re: Defendant’s
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, July 9, 2010, http://www.
scribd.com/doc/34122318/Sony-v-Tenenbaum-Damages-Ruling
2. Jonathan Saltzman, “BU student fined $675,000 for illegal
music downloads,” The Boston Globe, August 1, 2009, http://www.
boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/08/01/bu_student_fined_675000_for_illegal_music_downloads/
3. Jonathan Saltzman, “File-sharing damages reduced tenfold,” The
Boston Globe, July 10, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/
massachusetts/articles/2010/07/10/file_sharing_damages_reduced_
tenfold/?page=full
4. Eric Goldman, “Copyright Statutory Damages Award Violates
Constitutional Due Process--Sony v. Tenenbaum,” Technology &
Marketing Law Blog, July 12, 2010, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2010/07/copyright_statu.htm
5. Virgin Records America v. Thomas, April 19, 2006, Justia
Dockets & Filings, http://dockets.justia.com/docket/minnesota/
mndce/0:2006cv01497/82850/
6. Nate Anderson, “Judge slams, slashes ‘unconstitutional’
$675,000 P2P award,” ars technica, July 2010, http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/news/2010/07/judge-slams-slashes-unconstitution-
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On its website, the RIAA explains that it is “the trade
organization that supports and promotes the creative and
financial vitality of the major music companies.”7 Their
self-description later declares that “the RIAA works to
protect the intellectual property and First Amendment
rights of artists and music labels,” as if that is not the
mission which has made the organization notorious.
Even though the RIAA formally stopped suing its
members’
customers in
2008,8 a lot
of irreparable
damage had
already been
done to its
reputation,
and the
repercussions continue. Through the course of its fiveyear campaign, the RIAA actively filed lawsuits against
35,000 people, including a recently deceased 83-yearold woman, a thirteen-year-old girl,9 and a family that
reportedly did not own a computer.10 And rather than
decreasing the amount of piracy, the efforts apparently
increased the amount of P2P file sharing.11 Most of
those sued settled—for “extortion-like fees”12—or the
al-675000-p2p-award.ars
7. “RIAA – Who We Are”, Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), http://riaa.org/aboutus.php
8. Sarah McBride and Ethan Smith, “Music Industry to Abandon
Mass Suits,” The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2008, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html
9. Id.
10. Anders Bylund, “RIAA sues computer-less family, 234 others,
for file sharing,” ars technica, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/04/6662.ars
11. “RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later,” Electronic Frontier
Foundation, September 2008, http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-peopleyears-later#7
12. Mike Masnick, “Defining Success: Were The RIAA’s Lawsuits
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cases were dropped. Only two defendants went to
trial in federal court, Jammie Thomas-Rasset and Joel
Tenenbaum. These ongoing disputes continue to garner
national attention because they are, as even notable
sympathizer Techdirt’s Michael Masnick said, “very
flawed defendants who probably shouldn’t have gone
through with their fights against the RIAA”13 because of
evidence that both were actually avid file-sharers.

Saltzman said that when he called Tenenbaum on the
day that the decision came out, Tenenbaum said that he
had not heard that the ruling came down, he had not
yet paid any money, and he does not plan to, as even
the reduced amount is still “unpayable.” Saltzman also
added that Tenenbaum’s lawyer, Harvard Law School
Professor Charles Nesson, said that he was inclined to
appeal because he thinks the award is still too large.

Tenenbaum, a 26-year-old Boston University graduate
student, went to trial at the end of July 200914 for
illegally downloading music; the jury awarded the record
labels a combined $675,000 for the 30 songs.15 Because
the jury had deemed his infringements “willful”—
Tenenbaum had “unapologetically admitted from the
witness stand that he had illegally downloaded and
shared hundreds of songs from 1999 to at least 2007
through peer-to-peer networks”—by federal law, the
jury had to award between $750-$150,000 for the
infringement of each song. He was fined $22,500 for
each of the 30 songs, totaling the $675,000. Last week,
on July 9, 2010, Boston federal judge Nancy Gertner
reduced the penalty to ten percent16—$2,250 per song,
and thus $67,500.

Even advocates for Tenenbaum are likely to disagree with
parts of Professor Nesson’s unique approach and chosen
arguments, particularly the fair use defense. According
to Judge Gertner, Nesson, on behalf of Tenenbaum,
“argued that every noncommercial use is ‘presumptively
fair’ and that the question of fair use in his case
‘belong[ed] entirely to the jury, which [was] entitled to
consider any and all factors touching on its innate sense
of fairness.’” Gertner’s analysis of this reasoning was
on point and showed surprising affinity for fair use and
similar doctrines; yet even fair use enthusiasts like Mike
Masnick18 and the author of this column19 agree that the
fair use defense was not a logical defense, either.

Boston Globe writer Jonathan Saltzman said in a video
piece accompanying the article17 that it was “pretty
apparent at the hearing earlier this year that Judge
Gertner was very sympathetic to individuals who’ve
been sued by the record labels.” Although Gertner
acknowledged that Joel Tenenbaum was not blameless,
as he had continued to download music even after
repeatedly warned not to, she maintained that “an
award of $675,000 was grossly excessive, and, in fact,
violated the provision in the Constitution that says you
cannot punish someone with grossly excessive awards.”
A Success Or Not?,” techdirt, June 7, 2010, http://www.techdirt.
com/articles/20100606/2308559704.shtml
13. Mike Masnick, “Judge Says Damages In Tenenbaum Case
Were ‘Unconstitutionally Excessive’,” techdirt, July 9, 2010, http://
techdirt.com/articles/20100709/11305410154.shtml
14. Jonathan Saltzman, “Four record labels suing BU student,” The
Boston Globe, July 28, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2009/07/28/four_record_labels_suing_bu_student/
15. Jonathan Saltzman, “BU student fined $675,000 for illegal
music downloads,” The Boston Globe, August 1, 2009, http://www.
boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/08/01/bu_student_fined_675000_for_illegal_music_downloads/
16. Jonathan Saltzman, “File-sharing damages reduced tenfold,”
The Boston Globe, July 10, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2010/07/10/file_sharing_damages_reduced_tenfold/?page=full
17. Id.

Gertner’s conclusion, with her unmasked opinion on
the (un)fairness of the calculation of the “statutory
damages” in light of the harm20 or “actual damages,”21
and summaries of her Constitutional interpretations, is
copied below:
The jury’s $675,000 award is wholly out of
proportion with the government’s legitimate interests in
compensating the plaintiffs and deterring unlawful filesharing. No plausible rationale can be crafted to support
the award. It cannot withstand scrutiny under the Due
Process Clause.
I grant Tenenbaum’s Motion for a New Trial or
Remittitur . . . insofar as it seeks a reduction in the
18. Mike Masnick, “Nesson Asking For Retrial In Tenenbaum Case, Claims It Was The Judge Who Screwed Up, Not
Him,” techdirt, December 9, 2009, http://techdirt.com/articles/20091209/0357087263.shtml
19. Ali Sternburg, “A Wireside Chat with Lawrence Lessig,” American University Intellectual Property Brief, May 3, 2010, http://
www.ipbrief.net/2010/05/03/a-wireside-chat-with-lawrence-lessig/
20. Mike Masnick, “Looking More Closely At Judge Gertner’s Constitutional Analysis Of Copyright Awards In Tenenbaum Case,” techdirt, July 12, 2010, http://techdirt.com/articles/20100712/03481710175.shtml
21. Ray Beckerman, “$675,000 verdict reduced to $67,500
in SONY v. Tenenbaum,” Recording Industry vs. The People,
July 9, 2010, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.
com/2010/07/675000-verdict-reduced-to-67500-in-sony.html

American University Intellectual Property Brief

29

jury’s award on the grounds that it is so grossly excessive
as to violate the Constitution. . . . I will amend the
judgment in this case to reduce the jury’s award to
$2,250 for each of the thirty infringed works.
The fact that I reduce this award, however,
obviously does not mean that Tenenbaum’s actions are
condoned or that wholesale file-sharing in comparable
circumstances is lawful. I have determined that
Tenenbaum’s conduct was not “fair use” and that it
infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights. Furthermore, the
jury’s award, even as reduced, is unquestionably severe
and is more than adequate to satisfy the statutory
purposes and the plaintiffs’ interests.
This decision is notable for several reasons. First, just
as the judge in the Jammie Thomas-Rasset case, Judge
Gertner ruled that the statutory damages awarded must
be reduced. This ability to fix unreasonable penalties is
interesting on its own merit, but particularly so because
these undeniably disproportionate rates were set by
Congress. This type of legislating from the bench by
activist judges—to throw out a few buzz phrases—can
be controversial, but it is a major way that copyright
norms have changed22 recently, particularly with the
doctrine of fair use.23 These rulings in two different
circuits—the Thomas-Rasset case in the Eighth Circuit
and the Tenenbaum case in the First Circuit—could
demonstrate another step toward acknowledging that
various areas of copyright law are in need of update and
reform24 to comply with modern technology and the
realities of consumer habits. In the realm of statutory
damages for infringement, often there is an accidental
conflation of commercial purposes (like selling
pirated CDs) with non-commercial uses (the type of
downloading Tenenbaum did for his own listening in his
home); some of the comments on the Techdirt piece25
have convincingly argued this. However, according
22. Joe Mullin, “John Paul Stevens: Assessing the Departing Justice’s IP Legacy,” Law.com, April 15, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/
cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202448116969&Justice_Stevens_Assessing_His_IP_Legacy
23. Peter Jaszi, “Keynote Address: The Future of Fair Use,” University of Maryland University College Center for Intellectual Property
2010 CIP Symposium: Sustaining Culture in Copyright, June 22,
2010, http://cipcommunity.org/s/1039/index.aspx?sid=1039&gid=
1&pgid=467#Jaszi_blurb
24. “The Copyright Reform Act (CRA),” Public Knowledge,
http://www.publicknowledge.org/cra/
25. Mike Masnick, “Judge Says Damages In Tenenbaum Case
Were ‘Unconstitutionally Excessive’,” techdirt, July 9, 2010, Blog
Comments, http://techdirt.com/articles/20100709/11305410154.
shtml#comments
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to another source, in the 1997 No Electronic Theft
Act, “Congress sent the clear signal that it wanted to
jail non-commercial online infringers.”26 There are
also foreboding threats to public interests and civil
liberties from the international negotiations surrounding
the drafts of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA),27 including these types of unreasonable
damages.
On a broader level, the developments in this case signify
the music industry’s failure to adapt to what is reasonable
and realistic. While some may have thought, or at least
hoped, that “unquestionably severe” high damages would
disincentivize infringement, the industry’s insistence
on enforcing and policing its intellectual property28 has
made many decide that the copyright owners are out of
touch with reality. These two key RIAA cases are not
yet concluded, and as they continue, they are likely to
further harm the already poor relations with music fans
that industry organizations like the RIAA, and others
like ASCAP,29 have managed to cultivate by choosing
their particular battles against the people who quite
clearly appreciate music. These cases join other recent
decisions, including significant victories, like YouTube v.
Viacom,30 and some more nuanced partial developments,
like Salinger v. Colting.31
With changes and modernizations in the Internet and
technology come opportunities for artists to create and
distribute their works in more innovative ways, and
I look forward to when the industry decides to join
26. Eric Goldman, “Copyright Statutory Damages Award Violates
Constitutional Due Process--Sony v. Tenenbaum,” Technology &
Marketing Law Blog, July 12, 2010, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2010/07/copyright_statu.htm
27. “International Experts Find that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA) Threatens Public Interests,” Program
on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP), June 23,
2010, http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique
28. Ray Beckerman, “”Ha ha ha ha ha. RIAA paid its lawyers more
than $16,000,000 in 2008 to recover only $391,000!!!,” Recording
Industry vs. The People, July 13, 2010, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-paid-its-lawyers.
html
29. Joan Anderman, “Pay to play,” The Boston Globe, June 9,
2010, http://www.boston.com/ae/music/articles/2010/06/09/
pay_to_play/?page=full
30. Greg Lultschik, “YouTube Prevails Over Viacom In $1Billion Infringement Suit,” American University Intellectual Property
Brief, June 26, 2010, http://www.ipbrief.net/2010/06/26/youtubeprevails-over-viacom-in-1billion-infringement-suit/
31. Peter Jaszi, “The most important copyright decision of the
decade?,” ©ollectanea, June 6, 2010, http://chaucer.umuc.edu/
blogcip/collectanea/2010/06/the_most_important_copyright_d.
html
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these efforts and actually try to adapt to them—and
yes monetize them32—rather than to fight a doomed,
inevitably expensive battle against progress.
For more on the past, present, and future of Joel
Tenenbaum and the RIAA, see: http://joelfightsback.
com

32. Lawrence Lessig, “ASCAP’s attack on Creative Commons,” The
Huffington Post, July 10, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
lawrence-lessig/ascaps-attack-on-creative_b_641965.html
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Digital “Library” HTMLComics Shut Down by FBI, DOJ and Publishers
By Mark Tratos

This piece was originally featured as a column at www.ipbrief.net. Columns explore various
intellectual property law issues in a journalistic format, providing a detailed overview of the
subject.
On May 5, 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) shut down the website www.HTMLComics.
com (“HTMLComics”) and confiscated all of the
website’s servers after a search for evidence of copyright
infringement.1 The FBI conducted their investigation
with help from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and
a consortium of comic book publishers including Marvel
Comics (“Marvel”), DC Comics (“DC”), Dark Horse
Comics, Archie Comics, Conan Properties Int’l LLC,
and Mirage Studios Inc.2 HTMLComics was thought
to be the most wellknown and possibly
largest website on the
Internet that made
comics viewable
to the public. The
site purported
to be visited 1.6
million times per
day in April 2010 and displayed more than 6,630,021
pages of comic books online.3 The comics on display
included some of the most famous fictional figures in
entertainment today, including Spider-Man, The X-Men,
Superman, Batman, Star Wars, Dilbert, Hellboy, and Buffy
the Vampire Slayer.4 In addition to the comic books,
the website supposedly displayed the Bible and other
“written works”5 like Playboy Magazine and Maxim
Magazine.6 A lawsuit was filed in Tampa federal court on
1. Press Release, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Pirate Website
www.Htmlcomics.com Shut Down by Coordinated Efforts of Department of Justice, FBI, Kattne and Consortium of Comic Publishers (May
5, 2010) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Comic’s And The Written Word, NerdSociety, Apr. 12, 2010,
http://www.nerdsociety.com/2010/04/12/comics-and-the-writtenword-part-2/.
6. Suzette Laboy, Feds Sue 6 Websites for Offering Free Comic
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May 27.7
The hosting of literature online is not a new issue for
intellectual property attorneys. In recent years, however,
one company in particular has brought the issue to
the forefront of the law – Google. Starting in 2002,
Google began the ambitious project of digitizing every
book published on the planet.8 By 2004, Google began
to scan 15 million books from some of the world’s
most well known libraries.9 The project soon spurred
a class-action lawsuit
brought by various
authors and publishers
who challenged the
legality of digitization.10
Eventually, a settlement
was reached out of court
in 2008.11 While many
parties are still not happy
with the deal, authors and publishers are finally getting
paid royalties for their works.12 More importantly for
copyright law, however, Google may only display a small
portion of any book still protected by copyright; the
entire book cannot be viewed online.13 The effort by
Google to create the world’s largest digital library was
halted in its tracks, only to be resuscitated by Mr. Hart a
Books, Physorg.com, May 28, 2010, http://www.physorg.com/
news194288285.html.
7. Id.
8. Google Book Search, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2009, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/google_
inc/google_book_search/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Google%20
books&st=cse.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Terms of Digital Book
Deal with Google Revisited, N.Y. Times, November 13, 2009, at B2.
13. Id.
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year later.
The history of comic books online has been relatively
brief when compared to Google’s attempts to digitize
books, but that history has expanded quite recently. A
few years ago, Marvel unveiled its digital subscription
service. “Marvel Digital Comics Unlimited” allows
a subscriber to pay a monthly or yearly fee to access
over five thousand comic books from a digital library
accessible on a personal computer.14 The library consists
of recently published issues and some of the most
famous books in comic book lore.15 The digital market
soon expanded with the help of Apple’s iPhone and
iPad. Upon release of the iPhone, the Comixology
App16 allows users to view licensed comic books from
Marvel, DC and a plethora of independent publishers
on the handheld device. The iPad soon led both Marvel
and DC to create applications that allow iPad users to
download comic books on the same day that the books
are available on the newsstand.17 While it seemed that
the major comic publishers were truly embracing the
“Digital Age,” Mr. Hart was set on pushing that age
further by creating a digital library to overtake Google’s
attempts and eventually the Library of Congress. He
started with comic books.
Gregory Hart is a programmer who, for a time, worked
for the United States Postal Service creating programs
to increase office efficiency.18 Eventually, through his
own company, Database Engineers Inc.,19 he developed
his work into the program that served as the viewing
method for those who visited HTMLComics. Hart
operated the website by receiving donations of digital
comic book files from anonymous users and posting
these files on the website.20 The program would allow
users to view, but not download, the files.21 Because
download was near impossible, Hart claimed that his
website never actually “distributed” the comics, thus
making his website a “library” where one could “borrow”
the book, but never actually own it.22 The eventual
purpose of the HTMLComics library, according to Hart,
14. http://marvel.com/digitalcomics/how_it_works/.
15. Id.
16. http://www.comixology.com/digital/.
17. Joshua Mocle, Digital Comics and YOU!, Multiversity Comics, June 25, 2010, http://www.multiversitycomics.com/2010/06/
digital-comics-and-you.html#more.
18. See Comic’s And The Written Word, supra note 5.
19. http://www.databaseengineers.com/.
20. See Comic’s And The Written Word, supra note 5.
21. Id.; http://www.librarylaws.com/.
22. http://www.librarylaws.com/.

was to be a free digital library that would exceed the
scope of the Library of Congress.23
Hart’s justification behind the website revolved around
his belief that he created a library. His manifesto on
this belief can be seen at his website www.librarylaws.
com. Hart claims he created a library by providing a
“public resource for reading material.”24 He did not
charge money or require membership to view the
files, nor did he make money from advertising on the
website.25 Hart claimed that his “library is a more pure
form of non-profit than is a community public library,
or even the Library of Congress.”26 Hart goes on to
list several definitions of what a library is from sources
like the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Encyclopedia
Britannica, and Wikipedia.27 Finally, Hart alleged that “if
our presentation of literature is interpreted as being in
conflict with copyright laws, then too is every library in
existence.”28
Throughout his justification of the website, however,
Hart does not point to one court decision or one statute
of copyright law in the United States that substantiates
his view. In fact, in 2009 Mr. Hart was found on the
website www.Findlaw.com looking for legal validation
for HTMLComics’ actions.29 Hart asked if his definition
of a library would clear him from any possible violation
of U.S. copyright law.30 Nearly all of the responses he
received on the web forum directed him to seek counsel
from an attorney immediately because they believed
he was in violation of several different federal laws.31 It
appears that he should have heeded their advice.
Starting sometime in 2009, Mr. Hart began receiving
some notoriety for his website32 and then cease and
desist letters from the publishers themselves.33 It is
unclear what the communications asked of Mr. Hart
because the publishers have chosen to remain quiet, but
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Posting of Database Engineers, Inc. to FindLaw, http://
boards.answers.findlaw.com/n/pfx/forum.aspx?tsn=1&nav=messages
&webtag=fl-small_busine&tid=54640 (Mar. 9, 2009).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Lucas Siegel, Attn: Marvel and DC Legal Departments, http://
blog.newsarama.com/2009/01/15/attn-marvel-and-dc-legal-departments/ (Jan. 15, 2009).
33. See Laboy, supra note 6.
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Mr. Hart did make a few statements online that provide
some insight. He told the website www.Nerdsociety.com
that both “Marvel and DC leave me alone as long as I
stay 6 months to a year behind” the publication date of
the books.34 It should be noted, however, that the Marvel
digital comic service does not put most comic books
online until at least a year after the original publication
date.35 Hart also posted on the web-forum of www.
thenostalgialeague.com, stating that he had “spoken
with Marvel’s legal department and other lead officers
within their corporate structure” and he confirmed his
“approach is not distribution, hence the reason we’ve
been around for over a year.”36 Mr. Hart also claimed
on the forum, “Google is using our site as reference as
how to create an online library, and not violate copyright
laws.”37 Considering the current state of Mr. Hart’s
website though, it appears that he was unable to escape a
fate similar to that of Google Books.
As discourse about HTMLComics increased around
the Internet, so did the scrutiny of Hart’s motives for
creating the website. The pending lawsuit against
Mr. Hart alleges that he told Marvel’s attorneys that
if the company did not consent to a revenue-sharing
agreement, he would keep the site up and refuse to
charge people to view the comics.38 Comic book creator
Colleen Doran also alleges that in her encounters with
Mr. Hart he was very concerned with making money
through the site.39 She says that she asked Mr. Hart to
remove her work from his website and he responded,
“We’ll see you in court and we’ll be the ones cashing
your compensatory check.”40 If Mr. Hart was trying
to establish a “free” library for the world to use, he
appeared to be trying to find plenty of other ways for
HTMLComics to make money.

copyrighted work to the public. Whether the artists
and writers own the rights to their own work or if those
rights have been licensed should not matter to the court.
Hart displayed these works to the public without owning
any rights to the works. Mr. Hart has claimed that he
would only be liable if he “distributed” the books,42 but
the statute requires only that the work be displayed. To
“display,” an infringer need only show a copy of the work
through some device or process.43 These were digital
copies of the books displayed online for all the public to
see. It should not matter if the website was a “library” or
not. From the facts here, it appears that Mr. Hart will
have a tough time defending himself in this suit.
Mr. Hart believes he is right in his quest to create his
“library,” whether it is legal or not. Unfortunately, the
precedent of how Google was forced to handle its digital
books project does not bode well for Mr. Hart. Only
time will tell where this case ends up, but one man
taking on a resurging comic book industry does not
sound like an easy fight to win¾not unless that one man
is Superman.

So where did Mr. Hart go wrong? While the lawsuit
no doubt charges Hart with multiple violations of U.S.
Copyright law, the most blatant violation appears to be
that of the Right of Public Display.41 Title 17, Chapter
1, Section 106, clause 5 of the U.S. Code gives the
owner of a copyright the exclusive right to show the
34. See Comic’s And The Written Word, supra note 5.
35. http://marvel.com/digitalcomics/hq/.
36. Posting of Gregory Hart to The Comics Rack, http://thenostalgialeague.yuku.com/topic/2387 (Dec. 29, 2009).
37. Id.
38. See Laboy, supra note 6.
39. Pirate Website raided by FBI UPDATED, May 5, 2010,
http://adistantsoil.com/2010/05/05/pirate-website-raided-by-fbi/.
40. Id.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
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42. http://www.librarylaws.com/.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
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RIAA Monetary Recoveries in Illegal Downloading Cases Pale in
Comparison to Legal Fees Paid
By Ashley Kobi
This piece was originally featured as a blog post at www.ipbrief.net. The AU Intellectual
Property Brief provides daily content on hot issues, breaking news, and trends within
intellectual property law worldwide.
According to documents posted by p2pnet blog, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has
recovered a very small amount in damages in comparison to the millions they have spent in legal fees. The
RIAA paid more than $17 million in attorneys’ fees in
2008 alone and they only recovered $391,000. Recording Industry vs The People
and ITProPortal, noted
that $9.36 million went to
Holme Roberts & Owen,
$7 million went to Jenner & Block, and $1.25
million went to Cravath,
Swaine & Moore to
pursue copyright infringement claims in 2008.

Lamy, the senior vice president for communications for
the RIAA, pointed out to the ABA Journal that victories
are not always measured in dollars and cents and that the
organization’s “anti-piracy efforts are primarily designed
to foster a respect for the rights of creators.” The idea
is to raise awareness so fans will buy their music from
legitimate platforms. “And
on that count,” he says, “we
think our efforts have made
a real difference.” In addition, Lamy pointed out that
litigation often spans more
than one year, so legal fees
spent during one year can
often result in later victories.

This outflow of cash was
not new to the organization; in 2007 the RIAA
spent $24.5 million
and recovered only approximately $500,000 in
connection with copyright
infringement claims. In
2006, the RIAA spent over
$19 million in legal fees
and recovered $455,000.
So, over a three year period the organization spent
more than $60 million
and recovered less than
$1.5 million.
Although the documents posted on p2pnet blog further
call into question the effectiveness and success of the
RIAA’s aggressive litigation strategy to combat copyright
infringement, the RIAA has staunchly defended its expenditures for copyright infringement claims. Jonathan
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Australian Band Men At Work To Pay For Copyright Infringement
By Jack Korba
This piece was originally featured as a blog post at www.ipbrief.net. The AU Intellectual
Property Brief provides daily content on hot issues, breaking news, and trends within
intellectual property law worldwide.
An Australian judge has ordered the band Men At Work
to pay for copyright infringement of a 1930s Australian nursery rhyme in connection with their 1980s hit
“Down Under.” The judge determined that the flute
riff in “Down Under” was substantially copied from the
song “Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree,” which was
composed in 1934. The penalty assessed was 5 percent
of their royalty fees made from the song. This amount
was significantly less than the 60 percent demanded
from Larrikin Music,
copyright holders of the
song. The company
bought the rights to the
song back in 1990 for
$6,000.

to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Men At
Work’s recording company EMI plans to appeal the
decision.
For more on this story see “Court slaps EMI Men At
Work for copying children’s song” by Mike Cherney at
http://blogs.forbes.com/docket/2010/07/06/court-slapsemi-men-at-work-for-copying-from-childrens-song/.

According to Men At
Work’s Colin Hay, the
group never sought to
obtain the rights to use
the song because they had
“unconsciously” used it
in writing “Down Under.” In determining the
royalty award, the parties agreed that the award should be determined based
on a hypothetical bargain that would have been struck
between a willing licensor and willing licensee. However,
the parties disagreed over whether the award should be
based on a 1982 bargain or 2002 bargain.
While siding with the plaintiffs and choosing the 2002
bargain, Justice Peter Jacobsen stated that the timing
had little to do with the actual award. He rationalized
that the flute riff is hard to detect, which would have
given the licensor little bargaining power. Furthermore,
the similarity was not even recognized by a principal of
Larrikin until 2007 when the resemblance was noticed
in a television program. Even so, the award is estimated
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Thailand Thumbs Nose at USTR, Makes Affordable AIDS Treatment Top
Priority
By Greg Lultschik
This piece was originally featured as a blog post at www.ipbrief.net. The AU Intellectual
Property Brief provides daily content on hot issues, breaking news, and trends within
intellectual property law worldwide.
Thailand is making waves on the international patent
scene again with its plans to extend compulsory licensing
schemes for Sustiva and Kaletra, two important HIV/
AIDS drugs. With Thailand being a familiar face on the
USTR’s 301 report and its prior scrap over this licensing
plan with Kaletra owner Abbot Laboratories, the country seems to be willing to thumb its nose at the Trade
Representative and the pharma giant’s significant influence. The decision came down after the Disease Control
Department, the Department of Intellectual Property, the Foreign Ministry,
the Government Pharmaceutical Organization, the FDA,
and several AIDS activist
organizations agreed that the
compulsory licensing policy
was in accordance with the
2001 Doha Declaration. For
that many groups to reach
a mutual agreement, my
guess is that either some very
good coffee was served at the
meeting or that the representatives were told that lunch
was conditional upon their
reaching a conclusion.
In effect, the decision allows
the Thai government to continue importing generic
versions of the two drugs from India. With savings on
AIDS drugs standing at $36 million since the licenses
were imposed and $100 million in potential savings if
the licenses are extended for the duration of the patents,
the decision whether to maintain this policy has serious
implications for access to HIV/AIDS treatment in Thailand. With the licenses in place, approximately 29,360
people are receiving Sustiva and 6,200 have access to
Kaletra. Before, only 4,539 people could get Sustiva

and 39 could afford Kaletra. Yes, that’s 39 people out of
a nation with an HIV+ population of almost 610,000.
(http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/health/189154/
hiv-aids-drugs-licence-extended)
Some WCL students know that you can’t string together
the words “Doha,” “Pharmaceuticals,” and “301 report”
without attracting the attention of Professor Flynn over
at the Program on Information Justice and Intellectual
Property (PIJIP). Professor Flynn and PIJIP
covered this compulsory
licensing issue extensively back in 2007, and the
reports are still available
here. For some other PIJIP work on the Special
301 report and access to
medicines, check out the
links below.
Review of the 2010
Special 301 Report Sections on IP and Access to
Medicines
http://www.wcl.
american.edu/pijip/go/
blog-post/preliminaryreview-of-the-2010-special-301-report-sections-on-ip-and-access-to-medicines
PIJIP Calls for USTR Policy Change to Promote Access
to Medicines:
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/pijip03022010
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Judge to Inventor: You Can’t Trademark a Circle
By Eric Perrott
This piece was originally featured as a blog post at www.ipbrief.net. The AU Intellectual
Property Brief provides daily content on hot issues, breaking news, and trends within
intellectual property law worldwide.
Although his invention was “the most radical beach
fashion since the bikini,” Clemens Franek was denied a
trademark on his circular beach towel in a ruling by the
7th Circuit Court of Appeals. More than thirty years
ago, Franek designed a beach towel that allowed beachgoers to rotate around their
towel so they could evenly
fry their skin to a goldenbrown hue. It was a singlecolored fabric circle and it
was revolutionary. With the
help of Woody Harrelson
(yes, THAT Woody Harrelson), Franek’s towel made
appearances on The Tonight Show, Entertainment
Tonight, and The Oprah
Winfrey Show. But thirty
years later, the one of a kind
beach towel would learn
that maybe it wasn’t all that
distinctive.

towel industry, effectively smothering future innovations in towel technology. Finally, while invoking “Fit to
be Square” by Huey Lewis and the News, Chief Judge
Easterbrook explained (in all seriousness) that Franek
could have used a design patent to protect his invention,
or put some kind of distinctive
mark on the towel in order to
make it eligible for trademark
protections.

In 2006, Franek noticed
that circular beach towels
were being sold at both
Target and Wal-Mart and
brought lawsuits against the
two companies. Four years
later, Chief Judge Frank
Easterbrook ruled that no,
Franek cannot trademark a
circle. In his opinion, Chief
Judge Easterbrook not only espoused several key reasons
why Franek’s beach towel could not be trademarked, but
managed to do so with a plethora of puns and tonguein-cheek humor. While C.J. Easterbrook agrees that
the towel was the first of its kind, he ruled that giving
the indistinct fabric circle a trademark would stifle the
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Court Closes the Door on Inventors, Opens a Window for
Business-Method Patents
By Kristin Wall
This piece was originally featured as a blog post at www.ipbrief.net. The AU Intellectual
Property Brief provides daily content on hot issues, breaking news, and trends within
intellectual property law worldwide.
On Monday the Supreme Court issued their long-awaited ruling on Bilski v. Kappos, overturning the lower
court’s narrow test and allowing inventors to continue to
patent business methods.
The justices unanimously decided against the appellants,
two inventors seeking to patent a method for hedging
weather-based risk in commodities trading, finding their
claims too broad to be patentable.
Yet the Court was strongly divided on the
more fundamental issue of business-method patentability. The majority invalidated
the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation test,” whereby the method sought
to be patented must: 1) be sufficiently tied
to a machine, or 2) transform an article
from one state to another. Believed by
many to be overly stringent, this test would
invalidate a significant portion of currently
approved patents. The Court refused, however, to offer an alternative test for determining business-method patentability.
For those hoping to expand the scope of
patentability, today’s ruling was a victory. Without any
guidance or test for business-method patentability, the
lower courts are left to fend for themselves in granting
ownership of abstract methods.
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